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CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 
UNITED STATES V. DUNCAN: THE PROSECUTION OF 
FALSE STATEMENTS MADE TO GOVERNMENT 
AGENTS UNDER 18 USC § 1001 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Duncan,! the Ninth Circuit held that 
when a declarant makes an affirmative false statement2 to a gov-
ernment investigator, which could have influenced or affected a 
governmental function,3 the statement is punishable under 18 
U.S.C. section 1001.4 
On April 3, 1982, two special agents of United States Cus-
toms were on duty at the Los Angeles International Airport, ob-
serving travelers about to board a flight to Bolivia.1I Noticing de-
fendant's behavior, the agents became suspicious that he might 
1. 693 F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Alarcon, J.; the other panel members were 
Burna, D.J., sitting by designation, and Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
2. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 638 F.2d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 1980) (describing 
an "affirmative" false statement as more than a mere "no" answer to a question posed by 
a government agent). 
3. 693 F.2d at 976 (citing United States v. Carrier, 654 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(where the court stated that the test for determining the materiality of a falsification was 
whether the statement influenced or affected a governmental function». 
[d. 
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) provides: 
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any de-
partment or agency of the United States knowingly and will-
fully falsifies, conceals, or covers up by an trick, scheme, or 
device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudu-
lent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false 
writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not 
more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both. 
5. The agents' assignment was to "survey and, if necessary, search departing passen-
gers to ensure the compliance of international travelers with federal currency laws." 693 
F.2d at 973. 
87 
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be a currency smuggler.s When the agents questioned the defen-
dant about the amount of money he was carrying out of the 
country, the defendant responded falsely that he' possessed an 
amount under the legal limit.7 The agents searched the defen-
dant and discovered that he was carrying more than that 
amount.s They arrested him and charged him with lying to gov-
ernment agents in violation of section 1001, and with violating 
the currency reporting statute,' 31 U.S.C. section 5316.9 
The defendant was convicted on the section 1001 count.lO 
He appealed, contending that he could not be convicted under 
section 1001, because (1) there was a narrower, more specific 
statute which applied, (2) his statement was not material within 
the meaning of section 1001, and (3) his statement came under 
the "exculpatory no" exceptionll to the application of the stat-
ute. 12 A divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the decision of the 
6. The defendant was standing at the departure gate when he attracted the agents' 
attention. The agents found his behavior suspicious because he did not "have the same 
demeanor as the other passengers and did not appear ... to be someone looking forward. 
to a trip out of the United States." [d. The defendant was traveling alone, not talking to 
anyone, and appeared to be looking for someone. The agents believed that he met the 
narcotics/currency profile used by Customs to identify potential offenders. [d. 
7. The agents asked the defendant if he had anything to report to Customs prior to 
his departure. The defendant answered in the negative, and then offered, "I know I have 
to report anything over $5,000, but I have only $5,000." [d. at 974. , 
8. The defendant was carrying over $21,000, hidden in several places on his body. 
[d. 
9. [d.; The government dismissed the § 5316 count and proceeded to trail solely on 
the § 1001 charge. [d. at 973. See supra note 4 for text of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; 31 U.S.C. § 
5316 (1982) (amending 31 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "[AJ person .. 
. shall file a report . . . when the person . . . knowingly . . . transports . . . monetary 
instruments of more than $5,000 at one time ... from a place in the United States to or 
through a place outside the United States .... " [d.). 
10. [d. 
11. The "exculpatory no" exception is a judically engrafted exception to the statute, 
first adopted by the circuit courts in Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 309 
(5th Cir. 1962) (per curiam). The Fifth Circuit held that mere "no" answers denying 
involvement in criminal activity, given in response to questions initiated by the govern-
ment, without any affirmative, aggressive or overt misstatement on the part of the defen-
dant were not within the scope of § 1001. 
12. The defendant raised two other substantive grounds for reversal. First, the de-
fendant contended that the evidence against him should have been excluded because the 
stop and search at the airport was illegal, to wit, the agents stopped and searched the 
defendant without a warrant or probable cause. 693 F.2d at 974. Second, the defendant 
argued that his statements were inadmissible because they were made during a custodial 
interrogation before Miranda warnings were given. The defendant made his first state-
ment before the agents had probable cause to believe he had violated the currency stat-
utes. He made another statement after the agents discovered that he had violated those 
2
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District Court. 18 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Legislative History: 
Section 1001 provides that it is a federal offense to give a 
false statement to a government agent.l4 The statute prohibits 
statutes. 1d. at 979. 
In response to the defendant's first contention, the majority pointed out that the 
Ninth Circuit has held that a person leaving the United States may be stopped and 
searched without probable cause or any suspicion, pursuant to border search principles. 
1d. at 977 (citing United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978». But see United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) 
(where the Supreme Court recognized the constitutionality of making border searches of 
incoming travelers only). The majority noted that the Supreme Court has stated in dic-
tum that such searches do not violate the fourth amendment. 693 F.2d at 977 (citing 
California Bankers Assn v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 63 (1974) (where the Supreme Court 
stated in dictum that no violation of the fourth amendment occurs when those entering 
and leaving the country are "examined as to their belongings and effecta."» The major-
ity argued that a border search of departing travelers comports with the fourth amend-
ment, unless, considering the scope of the intrusion and the manner of its conduct, the 
search violates "reasonableness". 603 F.2d at 977 (citing United States v. Guadalupe-
Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1970) (where the Supreme Court stated that in the 
context of a border search reasonableness in "incapable of comprehensive definition or of 
mechanical application".» Under this rule, the majority determined that the stop and 
search of the defendant was reasonable. The search occurred at the "functional 
equivalent" of a border and there was no indication that the manner in which the search 
was conducted was unreasonable. The search was no longer than necessary to ensure that 
no laws were violated and was conducted out of the public view. 693 F.2d at 978. 
The dissent argued, however, that the stop and search was illegal on both statutory 
and constitutional grounds. First, the dissent pointed out that 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (1976), 
which grants Customs explicit authority to search travelers for unreported currency, 
plainly requires a warrant. 693 F.2d at 982. Second, the dissent cited United States v. 
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977), to show that the Supreme Court recognizes the constitu-
tionality of border searches with respect to incoming travelers only. 693 F.2d at 983. The. 
dissent maintained that the stop and search was illegal because the customs agents were 
unrestricted as to when and where they might perform the currency search involved in 
Duncan. 1d. The defendant had no notice that he might be searched. He was singled out 
solely because of his "supposedly" suspicious behavior. [d. 
In response to the defendant's second contention, the majority stated that the rule 
in the Ninth Circuit requires that Miranda warnings need not be given in border crossing 
situations "unless and until the questioning agents have probable cause to believe that 
the person questioned has committed an offense." 1d. at 979 (quoting, United States v. 
Estrada-Lucas, 651 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1980». The majority recognized that under 
this rule, one of the defendant's statements should have been excluded. 693 F.2d at 979. 
It concluded that the error was not grounds for reversal, however, because there was 
sufficient independent evidence of guilt. 1d. 
The dissent maintained that the statements obtained from the defendant should 
have been suppressed as fruit of the illegal stop and search. 1d. at 984. 
13. 693 F.2d at 973. 
14. See supra note 4 for text of § 1001. 
3
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false statements which both result in pecuniary or property loss 
to the government and which are designed to frustrate the 
proper functioning of the regulatory schemes of government. 111 
Section 1001 originated in the false claims and related false 
statements provisions of the Act of March 2, 1863.16 The original 
Act was narrowly drawn to prevent pecuniary loss to the United 
States resulting from false claims and related false statements 
made by military personnel upon or against the government.17 
From 1863 to 1934, the Act underwent several substantive 
changes which broadened its application.18 Until 1934, the Act 
only covered false statements relating to claims that involved 
pecuniary or property loss to the government.19 In 1934, during a 
period of national economic crisis, Congress further expanded 
the scope of the statute to include statements which impaired 
the proper functioning of government agencies.20 Congress has 
15. See United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86,93 (1941) (where the Supreme Court 
explained that the statute was intended to reach both cases involving pecuniary or prop-
erty loss to the government and cases where the false statement might pervert the au-
thorized functions of government). 
16. The original Act mad it a criminal offense for any person in the military forces 
of the United States to make a knowing false claim or related false statement to any 
officer or department of the government. Act of March 2, 1863, Ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696. 
17. See, e.g., United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 504 (1955), where the Su-
preme Court explained that the purpose of the Act was to prevent and punish frauds 
upon the Government of the United States, id. at 504, and pointed out that application 
of the Act was limited to military personnel. [d. at 504-05. 
18. The first revision occurred in 1873, when Congress made the Act applicable to 
"every person", instead of only military personnel. Codification of December 1, 1873, 
approved June 22, 1874, R.S. § 5438. 
The next significant revision occurred in 1918, when Congress extended the reach of 
the statute to cover false claims and related false statements given to "corporations in 
which the United States of America is a stockholder", in addition to those given to gov-
ernment agencies. Act of October 23, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-228, § 35, 40 Stat. 1015. 
19. See, e.g., United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339 (1926), where the Court empha-
sized narrow scope of the statute. The Supreme Court held that the Act did not pro-
scribe false statements made to Customs because the purpose of the statement was not 
to defraud the government of either its money or its property. 
20. The amendment eliminated all worda as to purpose and intent from the false 
statements statute. It extended the statue to cover any false statement "knowingly ... 
and willfully ... made . . . in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United States .... " Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-394, § 35,48 Stat. 
996. The purpose of the amendment was to remove the prior limitation of the statute to 
cases involving pecuniary or property loss to the government. Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 92-
93. Congress intended the amendment to protect the authorized functions of government 
from the frustration which might result from deceptive practices. [d. 
The historical situation which gave rise to the 1934 amendment was described by 
the Eighth Circuit: 
4
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not significantly changed the statute since 1934.21 
2. Supreme Court: 
The Supreme Court has discussed the scope of section 1001 
in three decisions and has held repeatedly that the statute 
should be construed broadly in order to protect the proper func-
tioning of the government. In United States u. Gilliland,22 de-
cided soon after the 1934 amendment, the Court established 
that th~ application of the statute was not limited to statements 
involving pecuniary or property loss to the government.23 The 
During the economic collapse of the 1930's the government, at 
an accelerated pace, began entering the field of economic re-
form and regulation. Jurisdiction over various parts of our 
economy was being delegated to innumerable federal agencies. 
For a proper functioning of their regulative and reform power 
these agencies depended upon information supplied by the in-
dividuals and corporations with which they were dealing. The 
giving of false information to these agencies would, of course, 
seriously pe~ert their functions, making effective regulations 
impossible. However, a fatal defect in the existing law made 
punishment of such fraudulent activity very difficult. 
Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1967). 
18. In 1948, Congress put false claims and reloted false statements provisions into their 
present form. The provisions were divided into two separate statutes. The false claims 
provisions became 18 U.S.C. § 281 (1969). The false statements provisions is now 18 
U.S.C. § 1001. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 1001, 62 Stat. 683. 
A revision of the criminal code, presently being considered by Congress, would nar-
row the scope of § 1001. The senate report on the revision suggests that the penalty for a 
false "no" given during a criminal investigation in response to questions initiated by the 
government should be lessened: 
[TJhe somewhat natural propensity to [give a false 
noJ-particularly in the context of an oral response to a law 
enforcement agent's on-the-spot interrogation-is deemed to 
warrant a less severe punishment, since such an exculpatory 
denial is not as likely as other false statements to be taken at 
face value and thereby to impede or affect the course or out-
come of the criminal investigation. 
S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 365, 390 (1980). The House Report seeks to remove 
altogether oral false statements from the scope of the statute. H.R. REP. No. 1396, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 171,181-82 (1980). The pending legislation is, of course, not binding on 
the courts. 
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 
22. 312 U.S. 86 (1941). 
23. The Supreme Court stated: 
The amendment ... broadened the provision so as to leave no 
adequate basis for the limited construction which had previ-
ously obtained .... [TJhere was no restriction to cases involv-
ing pecuniary or property loss to the government. The amend-
ment indicated the congressional intent to protect the 
5
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Court explained that the 1934 amendment reflected the congres-
sional intent to protect the authorized functions of governmen-
tal departments and agencies from the frustration which might 
result from deceptive practices.24 A few years later, in United 
States v. Bramblett,2G the Court stated that there was no indica-
tion in either the committee reports or in the congressional de-
bates that the scope of section 1001 was to be in any way re-
stricted.26 Most recently, in Bryson v. Ur..ited States,27 the Court 
made clear that the statute's jurisdictional requirement is not 
grounds to construe section 1001 as if its objects were narrow or 
technical.28 The Court concluded that the term "jurisdiction" as 
found within the statute should be interpreted broadly, since 
section 1001 is intended to protect the integrity of official 
iriquiries.29 
3. Ninth Circuit: 
In United States v. Brandow,30 where the defendant sub-
mitted a false written denial of involvement in a tax fraud to 
investigators of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the panel 
construed the statute broadly and held that section 1001 covered 
the statement.31 The panel emphasized that the false statement 
concerned a matter within the "jurisdiction" of the IRS, since as 
a matter of law the IRS had the power to act on the falsity.32 
[d. at 93. 
24. [d. 
authorized functions of governmental departments and agen-
cies from the perversion which might result from the deceptive 
practices described [in the statute]. We see no reason why this 
apparent intention should be frustrated by construction. 
25. 348 U.S. 503 (1955). 
26. The Supreme Court stated, "[a] greater variety of false statements were meant 
to be included [by the 1934 amendment]. There is no indication in either the committee 
reports or in the congressional debates that the scope of the statutes was to be in any 
way restricted." [d. at 507. 
27. 396 U.S. 64 (1969). 
28. [d .• at 70-7 (citing Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 742-43 (9th Cir. 1962) 
(where the court held that "jurisdiction" in section 1001 should not be interpreted as if 
its meaning were narrow or technical». 
29. The Supreme Court held that, "[a] statutory basis for an agency's request for 
information provides jurisdiction enough to punish fraudulent statements under § 1001." 
396 U.S. at 71. 
30. 268 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1959) (per Barnes,J.; the other panel members were 
Chambers, J., and Jertberg, J.). 
31. [d. at 562-65. 
32. [d. at 564. The Ninth Circuit held that "a false statement is submitted in a 
matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 
6
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The panel also noted that the statement was "material" within 
the meaning of section 1001 because the statement had the "in-
trinsic ability" to frustrate the functions of the agency 
involved.33 
In United States v. Bedore,a. where the defendant made an 
affirmative false statement .to a special agent of the Federal Bu-. 
reau of Investigation (FBI),31i the panel distinguished Brandow38 
and found that the defendant's false statement was not punisha-
ble under the statute.37 The panel identified three aspects of a 
false statement to be considered in a section 1001 prosecution: 
the nature of the statement;38 the effect of the statement on the 
government in general;39 and the effect of the statement on the 
§ 1001 if it relates to a matter as to which the Department had the power to act." Ogden, 
303 F.2d at 743. In Brandow, the false statement concerned a matter within the jurisdic-
tion of the IRS agents, because under 26 U.S.C. § 3654 (c)(l939) the agents were author-
ized to "see that all laws and regulations relating to the collection of internal revenue 
taxes are faithfully executed and complied with .... " 268 F.2d at 564. Moreover, the 
agents were authorized ~ "aid in the prevention, detection, and punishment of any 
frauds in relation thereto." Id. 
33. The panel stated that because § 1001 is "highly penal" it must be construed as 
applicable only to material statements, that is false "statements that could affect or in-
ftuence the exercise of a governmental function." 268 F.2d at 565 (quoting Freidus v. 
United States, 223 F.2d 598, SOl (D.C. Cir. 1955». The panel found Brandow's statement 
to be "material" because it was calculated to induce agency action or reliance. 268 F.2d 
at 565. 
34. 455 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1972). 
35. Id. at 1110. The defendant made a false affirmative oral statement. When an 
FBI agent went to his home to serve him with a subpoena, Bedore told the agent that his 
name was "Tom Halstead" and that Bedore was not there. Id. 
36. Id. The court noted that it was not concerned with those portions of § 1001 that 
penalize the use of false, fraudulent or fictitious writings. Id. at 1110 n.l. Because Bran-
dow involved false written statements in an affidavit, the panel stated that it did not find 
the decision helpful. Id. 
37. Id. at 1UO. The court stated that § 1001 could not be read literally: 
If ... section 1001 were read literally, virtually any false state-
ment, sworn or unsworn, written or oral, made to a Govern-
ment employee could be penalized as a felony. Thus read, sec-
tion 1001 would swallow up perjury statutes and a plethora of 
other federal statutes proscribing the making of false repre-
sentations in respect of specific agencies and activities of Gov-
ernment. Extension of section 1001 to its literal breadth, how-
ever, cannot be justified by its legislative history. 
Id. It concluded that Bedore's statement was not the kind of statement intended to be 
covered by § 1101. Id. 
38. The panel considered whether the false statement was oral or written, sworn or 
unsworn, requested or volunteered. Id. at UU. 
39. The panel considered whether the statement was related to a claim upon or 
against the government which could relate to property or pecuniary loss to the United 
7
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functions of the particular agency involved!O The panel con-
cluded that oral, unsworn false statements given in response to 
questions initiated by the government and which failed to relate 
to a claim upon or against' the government were not punishable 
under section 1001, unless they "substantially impaired" the 
functions entrusted by law to the agency involved.41 
Subsequent to Bedore, in United State v. Ratner,42 the cir-
cuit limited Bedore's "substantial impairment" test for the ma-
teriality of a false statement to situations where a law enforce-
ment agent, such as an FBI agent, was involved.43 In United 
States v. Gold/ine,44 the panel held that when the declarant 
makes a false statement to a regulatory agent, such as an IRS 
agent, the Brandow "intrinsic ability" test applies!6 Similarly, 
in United States v. Carrier,48 the panel ruled that when the de-
clarant falsely replies to an inquiry by an administrative agent, 
such as a customs agent, the "intrinsic ability" test controls.47 
States. [d. 
40. The panel decided that statements like the one made by Bedore would not fall 
within the scope of § 1001 unless they "substantially impaired" the functions entrusted 
by law to the agency involved. [d. Typical of the kind of false statements which could be 
held to substantially impair the investigative functions of the agency involved are "false 
reports of crime made to federal law enforcement agencies that may engender groundless 
federal investigation." [d. 
41. [d. 
42. United States v. Ratner, 464 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1972) (where the panel found 
that Bedore was a "policeman case" which only controlled in the "exculpatory no" 
situation). 
43. [d. at 105. 
44. 538 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976). 
45. Goldfine was a DEA case. The statement was made by a registered pharmacist 
during the course of an inspection conducted by the regulatory agency charged with the 
duty of investigating the manner in which the pharmacist was complying with the re-
quirements imposed upon him by law. Applying the ','intrinsic impairment" test, the 
court held his statement to be covered by § 1001. The majority distinguished this situa-
tion from that in Bedore, where the declarant's statement was unrelated to any claim of 
privilege from the United States. [d. at 821. 
46. 654 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1981). 
47. Carrier was a Customs case, where the panel followed Goldfine in using Bran-
dow's "intrinsic impairment" test. [d. at 561. The panel stated (1) that the declarant was 
claiming the privilege of entry into the United States and that that alone was enough to 
take the case outside of the Bedore decision; and (2) that the defendant's false "no" 
answer to any inquiry by customs could very well affect the exercise of governmental 
functions and agency decisions since it would have a tendency to prevent Customs from 
fulfilling their administrative duty to require persons entering the United States to file a 
currency reporting form in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 1001. 654 F.2d at 561-62. 
The rationale behind the choice of tests was that in all but the pure law enforcement 
'cases, the declarant's false statement related to a claim upon or against the government 
8
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Subsequent to Bedore, the Ninth Circuit also began to follow 
the strict rule that section 1001 covers false affirmative state-
ments.·8 In United States v. Moore,49 where the declarant made 
an affirmative false statement to an administrative agent, the 
circuit held that any false statements made in response to a gov-
ernment agent's inquiry can form the basis of a section 1001 
conviction. lIo 
4. Other Circuits: 
The other circuits are divided on the issue of the scope of 
section 1001.111 Three categories of decisions may be discerned. 
The majority of circuit's construe the statute narrowly and 
find some exception to the application of section 1oo1.5l1 The 
Fifth Circuit, for example, recognizes a clearly defined "exculpa-
tory no" exception to the statute.5S An "exculpatory no" is a 
false denial of involvement in criminal activity given in response 
to questions initiated by a government investigator. 54 An "excul-
patory no" must satisfy four requirements in order to be consid-
ered outside the scope of section 1011:&5 the false "no" must not 
and thus affected the concerns which led to the passage of § 1001. In the law enforce-
ment situation described in Bedore, where the statement did not relate to a claim upon 
or against the government, the statement had to have a greater impact on the functions 
of the agency involved before it was considered punishable under § 1001. See Goldfine, 
538 F.2d at 826 (Ferguson, D.J. dissenting). 
48. The majority in Duncan also followed this rule. See infra notes 88-90 & accom-
panying text. But see, Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109 (where the defendant's false affirmative 
statement was not found to be within the scope of § 1(01). 
49. 638 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1980». 
50. Moore was a Customs case where the defendant volunteered a false affirmative 
statement to Customs agents. The panel held that any affirmative statement in response 
to a Customs agent's inquiry can form the basis of a § 1001 conviction. [d. at 1175. 
51. For a full discussion of this issue, see H.R. REP. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sese. 
171, 179-180 (1980). 
52. See generally United States v. Erhardt, 381 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1967) (where the 
court found that section 1001 was not meant to cover false statements that might infiu-
ence the outcome of a judicial proceeding); United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924 (7th 
Cir. 1960) (where the court excluded involuntary statements from the scope of § 1(01); 
Gonzales v. United States, 286 F.2d 118 (1Oth Cir. 1960)(where the court held that only 
material statements may be prosecuted under section 1(01), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 878 
(1965); Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967) (where the court found 
that no statements made to the FBI meet the jurisdictional requirement of § 1(01). 
53. See generally United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1974); United States 
v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d'1208 (5th Cir. 1978); Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 
298 (5th Cir. 1962). 
54. Paternostro, 311 F.2d at 305, 309. 
55. [d. 
9
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relate to any claim on the declarant's behalf against the United 
States;1I6 the "no" answer must not relate to the privilege of ob-
taining or retaining government employment;1I7 the circum-
stances surrounding the false "no" answer must have involved a 
definite possibility of self-incrimination;1I8 and the false state-
ment must have been sought aggressively by the government in-
vestigator.1I9 The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the nature of the 
statement, not the type of agency involved, determines the ap-
plicability of the exculpatory no exception.6o Even false state-
ments made to Customs, IRS, or DEA agents are covered by the 
exception, so long as the statements meet the necessary 
requirements.81 
The Second Circuit is representative of those circuits which 
broadly construe section 1001.82 In United States u. Adler,8s 
where the declarant lied to an FBI agent,84 the Second Circuit 
refused to exclude law enforcement agencies from the scope of 
section 1001.611 The panel stated that neither the legislative his-
tory nor recent decisions suggest that Congress intended investi-
56. [d. 
57. [d. 
58. [d. 
59. [d. 
60. The panel in Paternostro stated: 
It is our feeling that the "exculpatorty no" answer without any 
affirmative, aggressive or overt misstatement on the part of 
the defendant does not come within the scope of the statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 1001. Whether the Government agent to whom the 
answer is given be an agent of the F.B.I., a "policeman", or an 
, Internal Revenue agent, is of little consequence. The same 
rule should apply to all "policemen", and therefore, we cannot 
approve one rule for one type of agent and another rule for an 
agent of another department of the same Government. 
311 F.2d at 309. See also Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208 (where the court found that a 
false no answer made in response to an inquiry initiated by customs respecting unre-
ported currency was within the "exculpatory no" exception because the declarant be-
lieved that saying more than no would be incriminating). 
61. Paternostro, 311 F.2d at 309. 
62. The Ninth Circuit is included in this category. 
63. 380 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1967). 
64. [d. at 922. 
65. [d. The panel stated that it did not believe that making § 1001 applicable to 
false statements given to the FBI would deter individuals acting in good faith from vol-
untarily giving information or making complaints to the FBI. [d. The panel noted that it 
would not find an exception of the statute just because the penalty for a violation of 
§ 1001 might exceed the penalty for perjury. The matter of penalties is within the dis-
cretion of Congress. [d. 
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gative agencies to be denied the protection of section 1001.66 
The First Circuit adopted a unique approach to section 
1001. In United States v. Poutre,67 where the declarant lied to 
an IRS agent, the court declined to rule on the precise scope of 
section 1001.68 The court stated that although it was possible to 
justify the judicial engrafting of an exception to the statute,6' it 
preferred to wait for "legislative therapy" for section 1001.70 
C. THE COURT'S REASONING 
The Majority 
The majority in Duncan dealt with three issues raised by 
the defendant regarding the applicability of section 1001 to his 
false statement: (1) whether the existence of the narrower, more 
specific, currency reporting statute, 31 U.S.C. section 5316, 
which also prohibited his false statement, precluded the applica-
tion of section 1001; (2) whether the false statement was "mate-
rial" within the meaning of section 1001; and (3) whether the 
. false statement came within the "exculpatory no" exception to 
section 1001.71 
The majority refuted the defendant's contention with re-
spect to the first issue, stating that there was no reason the de-
fendant could not be charged and convicted under section 1001 
simply because another statute was also applicable.72 The panel 
observed that criminal conduct often entails the violation of 
66. [d. 
67. 646 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1980). Poutre involved false statements made to an IRS 
agent which were contrary to prior sworn statements. 
68. [d. at 686. 
69. [d. The panel acknowledged that an exception to § 1001 could be justified by the 
rationale that, if literally construed, § 1001 would swallow up perjury statutes. But the 
panel declined to adopt an arbitrary court·drawn line between affirmative and exculpa-
tory negative responses given to government investigators during criminal investigations. 
[d. 
70. The panel stated that there was an increasing liklihood of "legislative therapy of 
§ 1001 as the revision of Title 18 of the United States Code inches closer to final resolu-
tion." [d. 
71. 693 F.2d at 975. The defendant had argued that the narrower and more specific 
currency reporting statutes, 31 U.S.C. § 1001, and 31 U.S.C. § 1058 (1983), which pro-
vides, "whoever willfully violates any provision of this chapter or any regulation under 
this chapter shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, 
or both", precluded the arplication of § 1001 to his false statement. 693 F.2d at 975. 
72, [d. 
11
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more than one statute, and if the several statutes contain differ-
ent elements, the prosecutor can charge the defendant with vio-
lating any or all of the statutes.73 Further, the judge can convict 
the defendant of violating one or more of the statutes.74 Accord-
ingly' the majority concluded that since the elements of section 
1001 and 5316 are different, the government properly charged 
the defendant with violating section 1001, despite the existence 
of the narrower, more specific currency statute.711 
Turning to the second issue, the majority disagreed with the 
defendant's contention that his false statement was not material 
within the meaning of section 1001.78 The majority stated that 
the rule in the Ninth Circuit, as articulated in Goldfine," is that 
a statement satisfies the materiality requirement if it could have 
affected or influenced the exercise of a governmental function.78 
The majority pointed out that the court has followed this rule in 
prior customs decisions.79 For example, in Carrier,80 the Ninth 
Circuit found the defendant's false statement to be material 
since it had the natural tendency to prevent the customs agents 
. from fulfilling their administrative duty to require persons to file 
currency reporting forms.81 The majority conceded that Car-
rier's factual situation was different from Duncan's - Carrier 
was entering the country while Duncan was leavings! - yet the 
majority deemed this difference as insignificant.83 In both cases 
Customs had a duty to enforce reporting laws, and in both in-
stances a false answer could impair Customs' ability to func-
73. Id. (citing United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978) (where the panel 
impliedly held that if the counts are not redundant, that is if the statutes violated have 
different elements, then the defendant may be charged and convicted of violating one or 
more statutes». 
74. 693 F.2d at 975. 
75. Id. (relying on Moore, 638 F.2d 1171 (where the defendant was convicted of vio-
lating both §§ 1101 and 1001)). 
76. 693 F.2d at 975. 
77. 538 F.2d 815. 
78. 693 F.2d at 975. 
79. Id. 
80. 654 F.2d 559. 
81. Id. at 561-62. 
82. 693 F.2d at 976. 
83. Id. Note that the panel in Carrier found the fact that the defendant was enter-
ing the country to be very significant. The panel stated, "[hlere, the appellant was claim-
ing the privilege of entry into the United States. This alone is enough to take this case 
outside of the Bedore decision." 654 F.2d at 561. 
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tion.84 Therefore, the majority found that Duncan's false state-
ment was material within the meaning of section 1001.811 
With regard to the "exculpatory no" issue, the majority re-
jected Duncan's contention that his statement fell within the 
"exculpatory no" exception.88 First, the majority questioned the 
validity of the "exculpatory no" exception within the Ninth Cir-
cuit.87 Second, the majority explained that since Duncan made a 
false affirmative statement, the statement does not come within 
the exception88 under Ninth Circuit precedent. The majority 
stated that the Ninth Circuit follows the rule enunciated in 
Moore,89 that any affirmative false statement in response to a 
Customs agent's inquiry can form the basis of a section 1001 
conviction.90 Since Duncan did more than merely say no, the 
majority concluded that the statements were sufficient to form 
the basis of a section 1001 conviction.91 
The Dissent 
In dissent, Judge Fletcher argued that section 1001 did not 
apply to the defendant's false statement.92 The dissent began its 
discussion by comparing the situation in Duncan to that in 
Bedore.9s The dissent maintained that the defendant's false 
statement was similar to Bedore's in terms of materiality, moral 
culpability, and potential for misleading governmental officials." 
Neither statement related to a claim of privilege from the 
United States or to a claim against the government.91i Both were 
oral, unsworn responses to inquiries by government investiga-
tors.98 Due to the· strong similarities. between the statements, the 
dissent argued that the majority should have followed the 
84. 693 F.2d at 976. 
85.Id. 
86.Id. 
87. Id. (citing Moore, 638 F.2d 1171). 
88. 693 F.2d at 976. 
89. 638 F.2d 1171. 
90. 693 F.2d at 976. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 984. Judge Fletcher's dissent characterized the § 1001 issue to be, 
"whether 18 U.S.C. § 1001 was ever intended by Congress to apply to the appellant'8 
false statement in the first place." Id. at 985. 
93.Id. 
94.Id. 
95.Id. 
96.Id. 
13
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Bedore approach to determine whether a false statement falls 
within the scope of section 1001.97 
In making her determination, Judge Fletcher scrutinized 
the structure of the Currency Reporting Act and found that 
Congress did not intend for section 1001 to apply to false state-
ments regarding unreported currency.98 Rather, such statements 
were meant to be penalized under the Currency Act.99 The dis-
sent explained that the Currency Reporting Act is divided into 
two parts: Section 1101 sets out the reporting requirements,l°o 
while section 1058 contains the sanctions for violation of the re-
quirements.101 The dissent argued that if Congress had intended 
section 1001 to apply to persons who violated section 5316, it 
would not have enacted a statute containing separate and spe-
cific penalties for the violations.102 
Additionally, the dissent pointed out that the statutory situ-
ation in Duncan is different from that in Gilliland,103 where the 
Supreme Court held that section 1001 applied to written viola-
tions of the Hot Oil Act, even though the Act carried its own 
lesser- penalty!04 The dissent distinguished the two cases on the 
97. Judge Fletcher stated: 
[d. at 985. 
98. [d. 
Plainly, the statement used to convict Duncan in this case did 
not threaten to "substantially impair the basic functions en-
trusted by law" to the Customs Service. The Customs Service 
did not rely in any way upon the contents of the statements in 
question .... Rather, Duncan's statements were elicited in 
response to formal questions preceding a search that the 
agents evidently intended to perform no matter what the 
response. 
99. Judge Fletcher observed: 
The only conceivable, but basically implausible, reason why 
Congress might have created the lesser penalty and still in-
tended some play for section 1001, would be that Congress in-
tended to distinguish between a simple failure to report and a 
currency reporting violation that is accomplished by affirma-
tive misrepresentations, allowing punishment of the latter 
much more harshly than a 'mere' failure to report. This hy-
pothesis finds no support in the legislative history,. however. 
[d. at 985-86. 
100. See supra note 9 for text of § 1001. 
101. See supra note 72 for text of § 1058. 
102. 693 F.2d at 985. 
103. 312 U.S. 86 (1941). 
104. 693 F.2d at 986-87 (citing Gilliland, supra note 22). 
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basis of section 1001's legislative history, which makes clear that 
section 1001 was meant to apply the Hot Oil Act violations, but 
does not indicate that section 1001 was intended as a sanction 
for currency reporting violations. 1011 
The dissent concluded that section 1001 should be inter-
preted narrowly.l08 It should not be used as a sanction against 
conduct already proscribed, unless the expansion is supported 
by legislative history. Since there is nothing in the legislative 
history to show that Congress intended section 1001 to cover the 
Duncan situation, the dissent determined that the defendant's 
false statements were outside the scope of section 1001.107 
D. CRITIQUE 
In Duncan, the Ninth Circuit departed from previous case 
law regarding the application of section 1001 to false statements 
made during criminal investigations. The majority held that the 
sole question for determining the materiality of a false state-
ment is whether the statement could have affected or influenced 
a governmental function. l08 The Circuit considered unimportant 
the nature of the statement and the statement's relation to a 
claim upon or against the United States,l°9 
The Ninth Circuit's present approach to section 1001 is un-
supported by the statute's legislative history. The original intent 
of the false statements statute was to prevent pecuniary or prop-
erty loss to the government resulting from false statements and 
related false claims made upon or against the United States. no 
Yet, in Duncan, the panel found "insignificant" the fact that the 
defendant's false statement failed to relate to a claim upon or 
against the United States.1ll The 1934 amendment indicated 
that Congress also intended the statute to protect the regulatory 
schemes of government from the perversion or frustration which 
105. The dissent also noted that the cases can be distinguished on the grounds that 
in Gilliland the false statement was written, while in Duncan the statement was oral. 
693 F.2d at 986-87. 
106. [d. at 987. 
107. [d. 
108. See supra notes 76-78 & accompanying text. 
109. See supra notes 82-83 & accompanying text. 
110. See supra note 17 & accompanying text. 
111. See supra notes 82-83 & accompanying text. 
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might result from deceptive practices.1l2 Yet the panel in 
Duncan considered of no import the fact that the government 
agents were investigators and that the defendant's false state-
ment did not impair the agents' ability to continue their 
investigation. us 
Here, the defendant's false statement should not have been 
considered punishable under section 1001. The false statement 
was ·made during a nonspecific criminal investigation initiated 
by special Customs agents. The statement was not unrelated ei-
ther to a claim of privilege from the government or to a claim 
against the government, and did not substantially impair the in-
vestigative functions of the agents involved. 
As soon as the agents noticed the defendant at the depar-
ture gate at the Los Angeles International Airport, they began a 
criminal investigation based on the fact that he was traveling 
alone, not talking to anyone and appeared to be looking for 
someone. The agents used the currency declaration requirements 
of section 1101 to create a situation in which to question and 
search the defendant. That is, the agents were not engaged in 
fulfilling an administrative duty of requiring persons who leave 
the United States to file a currency reporting form in accordance 
with section 1101. Rather, the agents focused on the currency 
statute solely to generate an opportunity to conduct a criminal 
investigation, interrogation, and search of the defendant. 
The defendant's false statement did not interfere with the 
investigative functions of the customs agents. The statement did 
not change the outcome of the investigation. It did not affect the 
agents' right to continue their investigation, nor did it change 
their ability to act on information received from the defendant. 
The statement was not a voluntarily given falsehood intended to 
provoke agency action, nor did it send the agents on a ground-
less investigation. Rather, the defendant's statement was elicited 
in response to formal questions preceding a search t~at the 
agents intended to perform regardless of the response. 
The panel should have followed the Bedore approach to the 
112. See supra notes 20 & accompanying text. 
113. 693 F.2d at 985. . 
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application of section 1001 to false statements made during 
criminal investigations. Under Bedore's 'substantial impair-
ment" test, the defendant's false statement would not have been 
considered sufficient to form the basis of a section 1001 convic-
tion. The defendant's false statement, similar to that of the de-
fendant in Bedore, was an oral, unsworn, response to questions 
initiated by government agents. Since the defendant was not en-
tering the country, the statement failed to relate to a claim 
against the government of the privilege of entry. Further, since 
the agents apparently intended to continue their investigation of 
the defendant regardless of his response to their questions, his 
false statement did not substantially impair their investigative 
function. Accordingly, the defendant's false statement should 
not have been found punishable under section 1001. Congress 
did not intend the defendant's statement to fall within the scope 
of the stat~te. The statement did not implicate any of the origi-
nal concerns which led· to the passage of section 1001, to wit, it 
failed to relate to a claim upon ·or against the United States and 
did not frustrate the functions of the agents involved. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Under the Duncan holding, virtually any false statement 
made to a government agent is considered to be within the scope 
of the statute. Mere denials of involvement in criminal activity 
made to investigative agents which would not result in pecuniary 
or property loss to the United States and which do not threaten 
to impair the functions of the agency involved are punishable by 
a $10,000 fine or a five-year prison term. The Ninth Circuit's 
approach is unreasonably severe in light of the statute's objec-
tive and will continue to result in unwarranted convictions and 
unfair punishments. 
Louise Pierce Sabella· 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1984. 
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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND FORFEITURE PRO-
CEEDINGS: IMBALANCE IN THE LAW? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz/ the Ninth Circuit 
held that the owner of an automobile loaned to another had no 
constitutional right to protes~ an unlawful search of that vehi-
cle. I The court found that the owner did not possess a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in the automobile solely on the basis 
of ownership. 8 
On the evening of April 2, 1982, claimant Aimee Webb' 
loaned her 1977 Mercedes Benz to Thomas Reese.4 While oper-
ating the vehicle, Reese was stopped by two Los Angeles police 
officers investigating the absence of license plates on the vehi-
cle.6 After Reese was. out of the vehicle, an unlawful search of 
the latter uncovered a package containing cocaine.6 Reese was 
arrested,7but in the ensuing State prosecution, the evidence was 
. suppressed as unlawfully seized, and the charges against him 
were dismissed.8 
Upon arriving at the scene, Webb told the officers that she 
owned the car and that Reese had permission to use it. Webb 
denied having any knowledge of the narcotics in the Mercedes,' 
and the officers then released the car to her.lO 
On the following day, however, Los Angeles police seized the 
Mercedes.ll The police later released the vehicle to the Drug En-
forcement Agency/I which initiated forfeiture proceedings 
against Webb. l8 The governD;lent was granted summary judg-
1. 708 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Boochever, C.J.; the other panel members were 
Wright, and Kennedy, JJ.). 
2. Id. at 449. 
3. Id. at 449-50. 
4. Id. at 446. 
5.Id. 
6.Id. 
7.Id. 
8. Id. at 447 n.2. 
9. Id. at 446. 
10.Id. 
11.Id. 
12.Id. 
13. Comprehensive Drug Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 511(c), 21 U.S.C. § 
18
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ment. 14 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit court, Webb contendedla 
that the evidence unlawfully seized should be excluded from the 
forfeiture proceeding. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Legitimate Expectation of Privacy 
Since Mapp v. Ohio,16 where the Supreme Court extended 
application of the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions, the 
Court has attempted to define the scope of the rule's applica-
tion.17 The Court, in defining the extent of the fourth amend-
ment in the landmark decision Katz v. United States,18 deter-
mined that the fourth amendment protects people, not places.19 
In excluding the evidence obtained through the government's 
use of an electronic listening device which monitored petitioner's 
telephone conversation, the Court noted that the proper focus in 
a fourth amendment inquiry is the privacy expectation of the 
individual rather than his or her property rights.20 
In Alderman v. United States,21 where petitioner urged 
suppression of evidence obtained through unlawful government 
eavesdropping of numerous telephone conversations, the Court 
held that the fourth amendment was a personal right which 
could not be vicariously asserted.22 Petitioner, who was neither a 
participant in the monitored conversations nor the owner of the 
premises where the conversations occurred, had no "standing" to 
881(d) (1976) & (Supp. V. 1981), allows the initiation of forfeiture proceedings when the 
government has shown probable cause sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the 
vehicle was used to transport contraband. 708 F.2d at 446, 447. 
14. ld. at 446. 
15.ld. 
16. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
17. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Alderman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 165 (1969); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
18. Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
19. ld. at 351. 
20. ld. at 351-352. In Katz the Court found that any evidence as to whether the 
government had physically trespassed while monitoring petitioner's phone conversation 
was irrelevant. !d. at 352. The significant factor was that Katz went into the public 
phone booth and shut the door, thereby expressing his intention to keep his telephone 
conversation from the "uninvited ear." ld. at 352. 
21. 394 U.S. 165 (1968). 
22. ld. at 171-175. 
19
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object to the government's unlawful activity. 23 
In Rakas v. Illinois,24 where petitioner protested the search 
of an automobile in which he was a passenger, the Court held 
that the proper inquiry to determine whether an individual had 
experienced a fourth amendment violation211 was whether that 
person had a "legitimate expectation of privacy"26 in the thing 
or area searched.27 The Rakas court stated that although prop-
erty interests alone are insufficient to establish a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy,28 the Supreme Court had not altogether 
abandoned the use of property concepts in determining the pres-
ence or absence of privacy interests protected by the fourth 
amendment.29 
The Court later in Rawlings v. Kentucky,30 described the 
23. [d. In reaching its decision not to extend application of the exclusionary rule 
other than to those whose personal fourth amendment rights were violated, the Court 
employed a balancing test. [d. at 174. The Court considered the deterrence aim of the 
exclusionary rule to be a major factor in this balancing test. [d. The Court, however, felt 
that the additional benefits of extending the rule did not justify "further encroachment 
upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquit-
ted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." [d. at 175. The 
court thus distinguished those who had personally experienced an unconstitutional 
search or seizure and then had evidence obtained as a result of this act used against 
them at trial from those who had this same evidence used against them at trial, but who 
had not personally experienced an unconstitutional search or seizure. [d. For "constitu-
tional purposes" the Court found a "substantial difference" between these two cases. [d. 
at 174. Finally, the Court noted that the exclusionary rule was judicially created and left 
it up to the legislative branch to expand fourth amendment protection. [d. at 175. 
24. 439 U.S. 128. 
25. The inquiry regarding whether a party may assert a fourth amendment violation 
in the past has been addressed under the rubric of "standing." However, "standing" is 
now to be subsumed within the larger question of whether petitioner's fourth amend-
ment rights have been violated. [d. at 139. 
26. [d. at 143. The phrase "legitimate expectation of privacy" is taken from Justice 
Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz: "My understanding of the rule that has emerged 
from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first, that a person has exhib-
ited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be 
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.''' Katz, 389 U.S. at 347 .. 
27. Rokas, 439 U.S. at 143. 
28. [d. at 143 n.12. 
29. [d. In Rokas, the court discussed their decision in Alderman as an example of 
the role property concepts should play in any legitimate expectation of privacy determi-
nation. In Alderman the Court noted that an individual's property interest in his home 
was so great as to allow him to object to electronic surveillance of conversations emanat-
ing from his home, even though he himself was not a party to the conversation. [d.; See 
394 U.S. at 176. 
30. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
20
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Rakas analysis as a totality of the circumstances test,3} in which 
a number of factors were to be considered32 such as ownership, 
the right to exclude others, and the relationship between the 
owner and the person in possession of the object searched.33 In 
Rawlings, the police illegally searched the purse of the defen-
dant's companion, finding drugs allegedly belonging to the de-
fendant. Applying the "totality of the circumstances", the Court 
found that the defendant Rawlings had no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in his friend's purse, and therefore had no stand-
ing to contest the illegal search.34 
Finally, in United States v. Salvucci,3/) where petitioners 
were indicted for unlawful possession of stolen mail, the Court 
found that while property rights were a factor to be considered, 
ownership of the property was not determinative.36 Rather than 
an analysis based on traditional property concepts, the Court 
found the more pertinent inquiry to be the right to exclude 
others and any precautions taken to maintain a privacy 
interest.37 
2. Diminished Expectation of Privacy in the Automobile 
In Cady v. Dumbroski,38 the Supreme Court held that 
automobiles are considered "effects" within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment, and therefore protected from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.3s However, in Chambers v. Maroney,.o the 
Court held that a different, lesser, standard of "reasonableness" 
should apply to automobile searches than used in a home or of-
fice. 41 The automobile's inherent mobility created circumstances 
31. [d. at 104. 
32. [d. at 105. 
33. [d at 104·106. 
34. [d. 
35. 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
36. [d. at 91. 
37. [d. 
38. Cady v. Dumbroski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). The fourth amendment provides: "The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures .... " [d. at 439. The Court's classification of 
automobiles as "effects" requires that a government search of an automobile, without 
consent, is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant. 
39. [d. 
40. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
41. [d. at 48 (citing Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 152-155 (1925». See also 
21
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of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, made vigorous en-
forcement of the warrant requirement impossible.42 The court 
concluded that because automobiles and similar objects43 were 
mobile, a different treatment was warranted.44 
Along with this element of inherent mobility, the Court also 
pointed out, in South Dakota u. OpP!!rman,4& that the expecta-
tion of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly 
less than the expectation in one's home or office.48 In Cardwell u. 
Lewis,4? the Court explained that there is a lesser expectation of 
privacy in the automobile because it functions mainly as trans-
portation, and it rarely serves as one's residence or as a reposi'-
tory of personal effects.48 Furthermore, it is driven on public 
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in 
plain view.49 
The Court additionally has pointed to other factors which 
reduce an automobile's privacy. States require all drivers to be 
licensed, &0 and both states and localities enact detailed codes 
regulating ownership and operation of vehicles. &1 Furthermore, 
law enforcement officials are brought into more frequent contact 
with automobiles than with homes or other geographically fixed 
areas. &2 Automobiles, unlike homes, also must undergo periodic 
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-367 (1964). 
42. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51. 
43. In Carrol the Court noted that ships, motorboats, and wagons would be treated 
similarly. 267 U.S. at 152-155. 
44. [d. The basic reason for the different treatment stems from the opportunity to 
move the object out of the locality or jurisdiction in which a warrant must be sought. [d. 
at 153. See also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974). 
45. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). In Opperman, the Court upheld an inventory search of 
petitioner's car after it had been impounded for multiple parking violations. The police 
found a bag of marijuana which petitioner unsuccessfully attempted to suppress. [d. at 
366. 
46. [d. at 367. 
47. 417 U.S. 583 (1974). In Lewis, the Court upheld a warrantless search of peti-
tioner's automobile while petitioner was in custody and while the automobile was in a 
public parking lot. [d. at 590. 
48. [d. 
49. [d. 
50. Cady v. Dumbroski, 413 U.S. at 368. 
51. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367-368. 
52. [d. In a footnote the Court notes that two of its decisions, Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) required a 
warrant to effect an administrative entry into and inspection of private dwellings or com-
mercial premises to ascertain health or safety violations. 428 U.S. 364, 367 n.2 In con-
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official inspection and are often taken into police custody in the 
interests of public safety. 53 These factors, taken together, ac-
cording to the Court in Cardwell v. Lewis,54 justified the applica-
tion of a less stringent warrant requirement to automobiles.55 
3. Circuit Court Application 
In a prosecution for conspiracy to smuggle marijuana, the 
Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Dyar,56 that no legitimate 
expectation of privacyll7 in a searched airplane exists solely on 
the basis of ownership. 58 The Dyar Court noted that even if pe-
titioner could show an ownership interest sufficient to satisfy 
"traditional property concepts" in order to establish a legitimate 
expectation of privacy he must also demonstrate a cognizable 
privacy interest in the place searched or the thing seized. 59 Ap-
plying the reasoning in Dyar, the Fourth,60 Eighth,6l Ninth,SI 
trast, this procedure has never been held applicable to automobile inspections for safety 
purposes. [d. at 367-68. 
53. [d. 
54. See Carrol, 267 U.S. 132. 
55. 417 U.S. at 590. 
56. 574 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978). 
57. Prior to Rakas, the Fifth Circuit had adopted the legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy language from Katz as the proper test to determine whether petitioner had exper-
ienced a fourth amendment violation. United States v. Nunn, 525 F.2d 958, 959 (5th Cir. 
1976). See also United States v. Mendoza, 500 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. 
McConnell, 500 F.2d 347 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 (1971); United States v. 
Hunt, 505 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975). 
58. United States v. Dyar, 574 F.2d at 1385. 
59. [d. at 1390. The Dyar court found that any personal privacy interest that peti-
tioner had through his ownership was abandoned when he gave possession over to an-
other. [d. Post Rakas decisions by the Fifth Circuit have reaffirmed the Dyar holding. 
See United States v. Vicknair, 610 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 
(1981); United States v. Meyer, 656 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Dunn, 674 
F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Parks, 684 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1982). 
60. In United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149 (4th Cir. 1980) (where petitioner 
was protesting a warrantless search of his "junker" car) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 
(1981), the Fourth Circuit noted that ownership alone is not enough to establish a Rakas 
legitimate expectation of privacy. [d. at 1154-1155. Rather, the Rakas inquiry was deter-
mined by a totality of the circumstances. See also United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 
411, 412-413 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Dickerson, 655 F.2d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 
1981); United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335, 1339-1340 (4th Cir. 1981). 
61. In United States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1978) (where petitioner was 
found to have legitimate expectation of privacy in a mailed package), the Eight Circuit 
pointed out that a bare assertion of a property interest without a supporting expectation 
of privacy would not give rise to a cognizable fourth amendment claim. [d. at 1369. But 
see United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1193 n.3 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
847 (1979). 
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TenthS8 and EleventhS4 Circuits similarly have held ownership 
alone as insufficient to establish a privacy interest. 
In United States v. Heydel,sr. where petitioner was found to 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his parent's home, 
the Fifth, Circuit stated that no one circumstance was "talis-
manic" to the Rakas inquiry.ss Rather, the determination as to 
whether petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the Rakas le-
gitimate expectation of privacy was to be made from the totality 
of the circumstances of the case.S7 Factors the Fifth Circuit con-
sidered other than ownership are: petitioner's possessory interest 
in the place searched or thing seized, the right to exclude others, 
prior use of the area searched or property seized, legitimate 
presence in the area searched and a subjective expectation of 
privacy.ss 
In United States v. Dall,sD where petitioner protested the 
62. In United States v. Medina·Verdugo, 637 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1979) (where peti-
tioner was contesting the search of a friend's purse), the Ninth Circuit noted that owner-
ship is but one factor to be considered when determining an individual's legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy. Id. at 652. See also United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th 
Cir. 1982); United States v. One 56 Foot Yacht Named Tahuma, 702 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
63. In United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 
918 (1981), the Tenth Circuit held that petitioner's bare legal ownership of a mobile 
home was insufficient to create a Rakas legitimate expectation of privacy. Id. at 1345. 
See also United States v. Montgomery, 620 F.2d 753, 759 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 882 (1980), United States v. $3,799.00 in United States Currency, 684 F.2d 674, 678 
(10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1440-1441 (1Oth Cir. 1983). 
64. In United States v. Friere, 710 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1983) (where petitioner was 
found to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his briefcase), the Eleventh Circuit 
noted that "mere ownership was not the talisman for Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence." Id. at 1519. However, the court went on to say "it is a bright star by which 
courts are guided when the place invaded enjoys universal acceptance as a haven of pri-
vacy, such as one's home." Id.; See also United States v. McCulley, 673 F.2d 346, 352 
(11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Hawkins, 681 F.2d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 
103 S.C. 354 (1982); United States v. Tones, 705, F.2d 1287, 1293-1294 (11th Cir. 1983). 
65. 649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982). 
66. Id. at 1154-1155. 
67.Id. 
68. Id. at 1154-1155. For other circuits' enunciations of these factors see United 
States v. Locham, 674 F.2d 960, 965 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 
47, 64 (2nd Cir. 1980); United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d at 1155-1156; United 
States v. Bentley, 706 F.2d 1498, 1505 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d at 
1335; United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d at 1440-1441; United States v. Friere, 710 F.2d at 
1518-1519. 
69. 608 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980). 
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search of the locked camper cap on his pickup truck, the First 
Circuit held that mere ownership of the pickup truck was insuf-
ficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy.70 In Dall, 
the court pointed out that petitioner's ownership claim was 
weakened by the diminished expectation of privacy surrounding 
the automobile,71 and reasoned that this claim was more attenu-
ated since petitioner relinquished possession of the truck.71 
Therefore, while ownership alone would not have been determi-
native, the attenuation surrounding petitioner's ownership claim 
contributed to defeat petitioner's claim of a Rakas legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy.73 
C. THE COURT'S REASONING 
In One 1977 Mercedes Benz, the court focused on pe-
titoner's fourth amendment assertions:7• Did Webb, the owner 
of the Mercedes suffer a fourth amendment intrusion7l1 when the 
automobile was unlawfully7s searched while in another's 
possession ?" 
The court, in applying the Rakas test, inquired· as to 
whether the unlawful search of Webb's automobile violated any 
legitimate expectation of privacy she may have had in the Mer-
. cedes while it was loaned to Reese.78 
70. ld. at 914. 
71. ld. at 914-915. 
72. ld. at 915. 
73. ld. Subsequent First Circuit decisions have reaffirmed Dall. In United States v. 
Smith, 621 F.2d 483 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. lO86 (1980), the Second Circuit 
found that petitioners did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in the trunk of 
an automobile that they were driving. ld. at 486-488. While applying the Rakas test, the 
Smith court pointed out that an individual's expectation of privacy in an automobile was 
significantly lower than his expectation of privacy in a residence. ld. 
74. Petitoner Webb also raised a number of other issues in her appeal. She con-
tended that forfeiture of her Mercedes was improper because it was not properly seized 
by either the state or the federal authorities. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d at 450. 
In conjunction with her unlawful seizure assertions, Webb also raised a jurisdictional 
issue.ld. Citing Ninth Circuit precedent, the court refused to decide the merits of these 
claims because they became irrelevant in light of the court's ruling that Webb had suf-
fered no personal fourth amendment violation. ld. Therefore, the sole issue decided by 
the court was whether Webb had suffered a personal fourth amendment violation. ld. 
75. ld. at 448 n.3. See also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139. 
76. ld. at 449-450. 
77. ld. at 448. 
78.ld. 
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The court observed that the Supreme Court has found 
automobiles to be surrounded by a diminished expectation of 
privacy.78 The court, citing Cardwell v. Lewis,80 noted that be-
cause a major function of an automobile is transportation, it 
does not carry the same expectation of privacy that a house or 
other fixed objects would.8} Additionally, the court relying on 
South Dakota v. Opperman,82 noted that due to the numerous 
regulatory laws concerning automobiles, police officers may justi-
fiably intrude further with regard to automobiles than with re-
gard to houses.88 Relying on these and other decisions,84 the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the automobile is surrounded by a 
diminished expectation of privacy.8& 
Next, the court examined Supreme Court decisions relating 
to whether ownership alone would confer to petitioner Webb a 
Rakas legitimate expectation of privacy.88 The court pointed out 
tha~ in Salvucci and Rawlings property ownership, although not 
determinative, was found to be a relevant factor in creating a 
legitimate expectation of privacy.87 While under Rakas, expecta-
tions of privacy may be legitimized by references to real or per-
sonal property concepts,88 the court found that the strength of 
any of these arguments depended on the circumstances of each 
case.as The right to exclude others and efforts taken to protect a 
privacy interest, for example, represent circumstances that 
would heighten an individual's expectation of privacy.so 
The court noted that in Dall, the First Circuit held the peti-
tioner ha~ no legitimate expectation of privacy in a truck which 
he loaned to another.S} The court also noted that it was unneces-
sary to go as far as Dall, since unlike Dall, no locked portions of 
79.ld. 
SO. 417 U.S. 583 (1974). 
81. 708 F.2d at 448. 
82. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
83. 708 F.2d at 448. 
84. Cady v. Dumbroski. 413 U.S. 433 (1973). 
85. 708 F.2d 448. 
86. Id. at 449. 
87.ld. 
88.ld. 
89.ld. 
9O.ld. 
91. Id. 
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the automobile were involved in the search.92 
Similarly, the court noted that in Dyar, the Fifth Circuit 
held that although the defendants asserted a leasehold interest 
in an airplane sufficient to create a traditional property right, 
they had abandoned any expectation of privacy when they gave 
possession of the plane to the pilot.98 
The court set forth what it considered the relevant factors 
to Webb's claim: Webb voluntarily turned her car over to Reese 
for his exclusive use, she did not take any precautions to safe-
guard any privacy interest she may have had in the Mercedes, 
and the police officer intruded only into the passenger compart-
ment where Reese could have invited anyone.9 • Based on these 
factors the court held that Webb waived her expectation of pri-
vacy and could not now protest the search of her Mercedes.911 
Recognizing the harshness of their decision, the court 
pointed out that Webb was not precluded from other means of 
redress, such as a claim for mitigation or a constitutional 
objection.ge 
[d. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. 
95. [d. at 449-450. 
96. [d. at 451 n.6. The court stated: 
[The result of the decision) may seem unduly harsh as applied 
to an innocent owner who lends property to another unaware 
that it will be used in violation of federal law. As we have seen 
that owner may be unable to protest either the unlawful 
seizure of the property or the evidence necessary to make a 
case for forfeiture. 
The court suggested two potential methods of remedy. [d. First the court pointed to 
dicta in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), which sug-
gested a possible constitutional claim by an owner who could. prove not only that he was 
uninvolved, but also that he had done all that he reasonably could to prevent the pro-
scribed use of his property. [d. at 689. 
The second suggested method of redress suggested by the court concerned proce-
dures for remission and mitigation contained in 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1976). See 21 U.S.C. § 
881(d) (Supp. V. 1981). Under this provision forfeiture may be remitted or mitigated if 
the owner acted without willful negligence or without an intention to violate the law. 
The regulations promulgated to implement § 1618 state that, if the property subje.ct to 
forfeiture was in the possession of another who was responsible for the violation of law 
bringing about the forfeiture, the owner must produce evidence explaining how the prop-
erty came in the possession of the other party, and showing that, prior to parting With 
the property, the owner did not know or have reasonable cause to believe that the prop-
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D. Critique 
The Ninth Circuit's application of the Rakas analysis to 
Webb's appeal stands on solid precedential ground. This deci-
sion, like both the First Circuit's Dall and the Fifth Circuit's 
Dyar decisions, is an appropriate application of the Supreme 
Court's position as expressed in Rakas, Rawlings, and Salvucci; 
the cases which narrowed and refined traditional "standing" 
analysis. This process of refinement was the inevitable result of 
the Supreme Court's Alderman decision, where the Court, after 
utilizing a balancing test, chose to restrict application of the ex-
clusionary rule to those who personally experienced a fourth 
amendment violation. 
Like Alderman, the Ninth Circuit classified Webb as one 
who was merely aggrieved by the introduction of damaging evi-
dence. As Webb was not directly subjected to unlawful policy 
activity, her claims to privacy in her automobile while it was 
loaned to another seem rather remote. In her appeal Webb 
demonstrated no effort to maintain a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in her Mercedes. No locked portions of the vehicle were 
involved over which Webb retained exclusive authority. Given 
the diminished expectation of privacy that has traditionally sur-
rounded the automobile, the court's decision denying Webb her 
Rakas privacy claim was proper. 
While the Ninth Circuit's holding is consistent with both 
Dall and Dyar, these decisions can be distinguished from the 
principal case in that they both involved petitioners who were 
criminal defendants. Webb, who merely lent her car to another, 
stands to lose her automobile for an illegal act of which she was 
no part. This injustice emanates from the forfeiture statute 
which enables the government to use evidence obtained in an 
unlawful manner while denying the aggrieved individuals the 
right to protest its use. Hence, the Ninth Circuit's decision illus-
trates the problem of applying fourth amendment law to forfei-
ture proceedings. 
erty would be used in violation of the law or that the violator had a criminal record or a 
general reputation for commercial crime. 19 C.F.R. § 171.13(a) (1982). 
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The court, recognizing the injustice arising out of forfeiture 
of an automobile belonging to someone innocent of criminal 
wrongdoing, pointed out in a footnote the alternative means of 
redress potentially available to Webb. First, the court mentioned 
a possible constitutional claim that had been suggested by the 
Supreme Court in dicta. However, both the Supreme Court and 
the Ninth Circuit failed to define this possible claim other than 
to suggest its potential existence. Secondly, the court suggested 
statutorily prescribed means of redress. However, serious ques-
tions remain as to whether Webb would qualify for this remedy 
because the statutory procedure may require Webb to show that 
prior to lending her car to Reese she did not know that he had a 
criminal record. Enforcement of this requirement would in effect 
penalize Webb for her association with a person with a criminal 
record. Furthermore, even if the court's suggested alternatives 
were found available to Webb, the time and expenses she would 
incur pursuing them may be prohibitive. 
The application of fourth amendment standards to the for-
feiture proceeding in the instant case can be faulted on grounds 
of both authority and fairness. Unlike the situations involved in 
other circuit decisions, the petitioner was neither accused of nor 
charged with any unlawful conduct with respect to the events 
which resulted in the seizure of her automobile. This result sug-
gests a fundamental unfairness in forfeiture law. After all, if a 
court applying the present standard must excuse the apparent 
inequity of its holding by suggesting some nebulous alternative 
methods of redress, then the law is lacking a desired 
equilibrium. 
Ansel D. Kinney* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1985. 
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UNITED STATES V. MORENO: HOMES EXPANDED 
UNDER THE KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE DOCTRINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Moreno l the Ninth Circuit held that the 
knock and announce provisions of 18 U.S.C. §31092 prohibited 
officers from forcibly entering an alcove adjacent to the front 
door of the defendant's apartment without first knocking and 
announcing their purpose at the entrance to the alcove. 8 
The defendant resided in a multi-unit apartment building .. · 
A solid front door leading to the interior of the defendant's 
apartment was recessed six feet from a common hallway, creat-
ing an alcove measuring approximately thirty-six square feet.' 
An ornamental wrought iron gate extending to the perimeter of 
the entrance to the alcove divided the alcove from the common 
hallway.6 The gate remained locked and only residents of the 
1. 701 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Hug, J.; the other panel members were Ely, and 
Conby, JJ.). 
2. The statute provides: 
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or 
window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, . 
to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority 
and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to 
liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the 
warrant. 
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976). 
3. 701 F.2d at 817. 
4. Id. at 816. The defendant's apartment was one of seventy-six similar apartments 
in the building. Id. The building itself was accessible via two glass-doored main entry 
ways situated at either end of the building. Brief for Appellee at 10 n.5, United States v. 
Moreno, 701 F.2d 815. These entrances remained locked, and only residents of the build-
ing had key access. Id. Although the officers gained entry through one of these main 
entrances without complying with 18 U.S.C. § 3109, no contention was made by the de-
fendant that that particular entry by the officers violated the statute. 701 F.2d at 816. 
Inside the building, common open-air hallways led to the various apartments. Id. at 815. 
The defendant's apartment shared one of these common hallways with two other apart-
ments. Id. 
5. 701 F.2d at 816. 
6. Id. The ornamental gate extended the width of the entrance, and extended to 
within several inches of both the floor and ceiling at the entrance to the alcove. Brief for 
Appellee at 11, United States v. Moreno, 701 F.2d 815. It was not possible to enter the 
defendant's apartment without passing through the gate. 701 F.2d at 816. The entry-way 
to the defendant's apartment was not unique from other apartment entry-ways in the 
building. Brief for Appellee at 12, United States v. Moreno, 701 F.2d 815. All apartments 
in the building had a similar ornamental iron gate leading t.o an alcove and an inner solid 
door.Id. 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss1/7
1984] CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 117 
defendant's apartment had keys.' Nonresidents gained access to 
the alcove only by ringing a buzzer located at the side of the 
gate.s Thus, the alcove was exclusively available to residents of 
the defendant's apartment.s 
Federal and local officers, in executing a search warrant of 
the defendant's apartment, arrived at the ornamental iron gate, 
and without knocking or giving notice to any occupant of the 
apartment, pried the gate open, entered the alcove, and ap-
proached the solid door of the apartment.10 One of the officers 
knocked on the solid door, announced that he was a police of-
ficer with a search warrant and demanded entry.ll A co-defen-
dant admitted the officers, and the subsequent search uncovered 
cocaine, cocaine paraphernalia, and firearms. 12 
At trial the defendant sought to suppress the evidence 
seized in the search, contending that the officers had violated 18 
U.S.C. § 3109 by entering the iron gate without knocking at the 
gate and announcing their official purpose.13 The District Court 
admitted the evidence finding that the defendant had no reason-
able expectation of privacy in the alcove area, and because of 
this could not expect 18 U.S.C. § 3109 to protect the area from 
official unannounced intrusion.14 The defendant appealed to the 
7. 701 F.2d at 816. 
8. [d. 
9. [d. 
10. [d. The officers had previously observed the layout of the entry-way and thus 
were aware that visitors gained entry to the apartment by notifying the occupants by 
ringing a buzzer near the gate. [d. 
U. [d. Testimony at trial indicated that it was always the officers intention to knock 
and make an announcement at the inner solid door, rather than at the iron gate. Brief 
for Appellee at U n.7, United States v. Moreno, 701 F.2d 815. There was no dispute in 
the case that the entry at the solid door complied with 18 U.S.C. § 3109. 701 F.2d at 816 
n.l. 
12. 701 F.2d at 816. 
13. [d. 
14. [d. The district court also found that, should 18 U.S.C. § 3109 apply to the al-
cove area, the officers entry at the gate would have none-the-Iess been lawful. [d. It 
found that any attempt to knock and announce at the gate would have been futile be-
cause the occupants would have been unable to hear the knocking or announcement. [d. 
at 817. The district court also found that the officers' suspicions that easily disposable 
contraband was within the apartment would have served as exigent circumstances to 
excuse the officers' non-compliance with the statute. [d. at 817-18. On appeal these two 
additional findings were refuted by the Ninth Circuit. [d. It found that the officers could 
have rang the buzzer located near the gate in order to alert the occupants within the 
apartment of their presence, and thus the defendant would have been notified of the 
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Ninth Circuit contending, inter alia, that he did in fact have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcove area. 111 
B. THE KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE DOCTRINE 
The concept requiring that notice be given before a lawful 
forcible entry into one's home has been traced back as far as 
biblical times,I6 However, it was not until 1806, in Semayne's 
Case,I'1 that the King's Bench first required an official give no-
tice and request admittance before forcing an entry into a citi-
zen's home. IS The rule in Semayne's Case has been adopted by 
American courts,19 and acceptance of the rule today is evidenced 
by the fact that thirty-three states20 and the federal govern-
mentU have codified the noticerequirement.22 
officers' presence. [d. at 817. It also found that in the absence of sounds or other indica-
tions that contraband was being destroyed within the apartment, the officers' suspicions 
that drugs were in the apartment were insufficient to constitute the necessary exigent 
circumstances to excUse the officers' non-compliance With 18 U.S.C. § 3109. [d. at 818. 
15. [d. at 816. 
16. Deuteronomy 24:10. For detailed history of the evolution of the knock and an-
nounce doctrine from biblical times to 20th century See N. LAssON, THE HISTORY AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937); 
Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139 (1970). 
17. 4 Coke 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603). 
18. The King's Bench in Semayne's Case stated: 
In all cases when the King is a party, the sheriff (if the doors 
be not open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him, 
or to do execution of the King's process, if otherwise he cannot 
enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of 
his coming, and to make request to open the doors . 
.. Coke at 92, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195. Although the case has long served American courts as 
the leading decision regarding forcible entries by law enforcement officials executing a 
criminal warrant, Semayne's Case was actually civil in nature and resulted from a sher-
iff's refused entry rather than from his forced entry. 
19. See United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992 (2nd Cir. 1971); United States v. 
Gervato, 474 F.2d 40 (3rd Cir. 1973); United States v. Whiting, 311 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 
1962); United States v. Johns, 466 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1972); Garza-Fuente v. United 
States, 400 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Fields, 355 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1966); 
United States v. Carringer, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lopez, 475 
F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. McClard, 462 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1972), af-
firming District Court opinion at 333 F. Supp. 158 (1971); United States v. Tolliver, 665 
F.2d 1005 (11th Cir. 1982); Perkins v. United States, 432 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1970), af-
firming District Court opinion at 286 F.Supp 259 (D.D.C. 1968); United States v. Harris, 
435 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Keiningham'v. United States, 287 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960). 
20. For a complete discussion and list of state statutes See Blakey, The Rule of 
Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112 
U. PA. L., REV. 499 (1964). 
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964). 
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The federal codification of the rule requires that an officer 
executing a search warrant give notice of authority and purpose, 
and, be refused admittance before breaking in any window or 
door of a house.2s In applying the federal statute for the first 
time, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. 
Miller,u stressed the importance of protecting the common law 
privacy interest which served as a basis for the statute, and 
stated that the statute was not to be gIven "grudging 
application. "211 
Lower courts have applied the Miller decision as the con-
trolling authority when applying 18 U.S.C. § 3109 to cases in-
volving an official unannounced entry into a home.26 The Miller 
decision, however, is limited to unlawful unannounced entries 
made into the home and does not address common law excep-
22. Early American courts, undoubtedly influenced by English Writs of Assistance, 
were quick to adopt Semayne's Case. "The act creating the Writs of Assistance granted 
the right of forcible entry to a customs official carrying a writ. He could take a constable 
or other civil official with him in the daytime to enter and go into my house, shop, cellar, 
warehouse or room or other place, and in case of resistance, to break open doors, chests, 
trunks and other packages, there to seize and from thence to bring any kind of goods or 
merchandise whatsoever, prohibited and uncustomed." 13-14 Charles II, c.I1, c. § IV, V; 
made applicable to colonies: 7-8 William II, c. 22 § II (1696)." Announcement in Police 
Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 145 n. 25 (1970). Note, however, that even these highly op-
pressive writs were to be executed only after an announcement and demand to enter the 
home were made. Thus, as early Americans were drafting the Bill of Rights, although no 
mention of a knock and announce requirement was included, with the abolished Writs of 
Assistance fresh in their minds, it is clear that they did not intend to lessen protection of 
the sanctity of the home by authorizing unannounced official entry, but rather consid-
ered the required announcement before official entry into one's home inherent in the 
authority to enter itself. Indeed, authorities agree that colonial's opposition to the En-
glish Writs of Assistance was so great that it became a major factor in sparking the 
American Revolution. See 80 YALE L.J. 139, and N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937). 
23. See supra note 2. 
24. 357 U.S. 301 (1958). 
25. The Miller Court stated: 
[d. at 313. 
The requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose 
before forcing entry into a home is deeply rooted in our heri-
tage and should not be given grudging application. Congress 
codifying a tradition entrenched in Anglo-American law, had 
declared in § 3109 the reverence of the law for the individual's 
right of privacy in his house. 
26. In Miller, which involved interpretation of a District of Columbia statute, the 
Court stated: "The validity of the entry to execute the arrest without a warrant must be 
tested by criteria identical with those embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3109, which deals with 
entry to execute a search warrant." [d. at 306. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 
(1960). 
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tions to the notice requirement.27 
Lower courts have developed three exceptions to the rule. 
Courts require no notice where an announcement could endan-
ger officers or others,28 where an announcement would be a use-
less gesture in light of surrounding circumstances,29 and where 
exigent circumstances necessitate an officer's unannounced en-
try.30 The Supreme Court has ruled that a state statute author-
izing an unannounced entry in exigent circumstances was consti-
tutional,31 but has yet to decide on the applicability of any of 
the three aforementioned exceptions under 18 U.S.C: § 3109. 
Thus, until the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in United States 
v. Fluker,32 application of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 has remained limited 
to situations involving either an unlawful unannounced official 
entry into a home or an exception to the notice requirement.33 
27. 357 u.S. 301. 
28. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1973). 
29. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 475 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1973). 
30. See, e.g., United States v. Salvador, 505 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1974). 
31. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
32. 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976). 
33. Most courts have uniformly held that once officers comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3109 
at the entrance to the premises, no additional notice is required for doors within the 
premises. See LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 4.8 at 130-31. Courts have also generally 
permitted officers to gain entry to dwellings by ruse, without complying with the notice 
requirement. Typcially, courts find that entry by ruse is not an exception to the notice 
requirement, but instead, since officers conducting the ruse are typically granted en-
trance freely by occupants, no rights of the occupants are violated. See Lewis v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); United States v. Dohm, 597 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Beale, 445 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hutchinson, 488 F.2d 484 
(8th Cir. 1973). Some courts have also extended the application of the notice require-
ment to officers' entrance to buildings other than personal dwellings. Note that in these 
cases, courts still limit application of the knock and announce rule to the entrance of the 
building. See United States v. Mullin, 329 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1964) (states in dicta that 
smokehouse located 75 feet from house would be protected by 18 U.S.C. § 3109); United 
States v. Case, 435 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1970) (extending 18 U.S.C. § 3109 to protect a 
printing store). But see United States v. Johns, 466 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1972) (refusing to 
find that small building near defendant's house was covered by 18 U.S.C. § 3109); Fields 
v. United States, 355 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1966) (finding that a chicken coop was not cov-
ered by the notice requirement); United States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(finding that a barbershop was not covered by the notice requirement); United States v. 
Hassel, 336 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that a barn was not protected by the stat-
ute); United States v. McClard, 462 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that the notice 
requirement did not apply to a barn, where the door was already open); United States v. 
Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding that the notice statute does not protect 
businesses). 
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The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Fluker,3. found that 
18 U.S.C. § 3109 applied to the entrance of a common hallway 
which led to two inner apartments. 3C1 In Fluker, where the of-
ficers made no attempt to notify occupants of the apartments 
prior to breaking into the common hallway, the court held that 
the entry violated 18 U.S.C. § 3109.36 In arriving at its holding, 
the court reviewed the decision of Wattenburg v. United 
States,37 where the court found that the fourth amendment pro-
hibited an unannounced search and seizure adjacent to a 
house.38 In Wattenburg, the search was found to violate the 
fourth amendment because it constituted an intrusion upon 
what the resident had sought to perserve as private.39 The court 
in Fluker concluded that in light of Wattenburg, the critical 
question in determining whether 18 U.S.C. § 3109 applied to the 
common hallway entrance was whether the defendant had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the hallway area.·o The court 
determined that the defendant did have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the area, and consequently found 18 U.S.C. § 
3109 applicable to the hallway adjacent to the defendant's 
apartment.41 
The Fluker court, noting the absence of any Supreme Court 
or federal appellate court precedent, cited United States v. 
Blank42 as the only authority supporting its decision to apply 18 
U.S.C. § 3109 to an area other than the home itself.·3 In Blank,4. 
officers broke into a common hallway unannounced, proceeded 
to the defendant's apartment door, and broke into the defen-
34. 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976). 
35. Id. at 716-17. 
36.Id. 
37. 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968). 
38. Id. at 858. The fourth amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
39. 388 F.2d at 857. 
40. 543 F.2d at 716. 
41. Id. at 716-17. 
42. 251 F. Supp. 166 (N.D. Ohio 1966). 
43. 543 F.2d at 715. 
44. 251 F. Supp. 166. 
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dant's apartment unannounced.·1i The defendant contended that 
both entries violated the fourth amendment, and that the entry 
into his apartment violated a statute prohibiting such unan-
nounced entry.48 Concluding that the officer's unannounced en-
try into the common hallway was in violation of the fourth 
amendment, the court deemed it unnecessary to analyze the of-
ficer's second entry into the defendant's apartment.47 In consid-
ering. whether the defendant had a protected interest in the 
common hallway,'s the Blank court found that the defendant's 
ability to lock the door and to exclude others "denotes a right of 
privacy," and that this privacy interest was protected from offi-
cial unannounced intrusion under the fourth amendment!& 
Thus, the Blank court held that under the fourth amendment, 
officers must announce their presence, identity and purpose 
prior to forceful entry into private premises. lio 
The Supreme Court has not considered whether the Fourth 
Amendment requires officers to give notice of their authority 
and purpose before forcibly entering a dwelling. iiI In Ker v. 
United States,1i2 however, Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined 
by the three other members of the Court, expressed the opinion 
45. Id.at 167. 
46. Id. at 168. The statute referred to in Blank is not identified in the opinion. 
·47. Id. at 175. 
48. Id. at 168-74. 
49. The Blank court stated: 
Id. at 173. 
The tenants possess a joint right, subject to the landlord's 
right to enter and use common portions of the premises, to 
exclude from or to admit to those premises whomever they 
choose. This area is by no means public. A locked door exclud-
ing the public from certain privately owned or leased property 
denotes a right of privacy therein to those who have the right 
to lock that door .... We hold that the petitioner does pos-
sess a protected interest in the integrity of the entire premises. 
50. In reference to the fourth amendment, the Blank court held: 
Id. at 167. 
This constitutional amendment requires that even when war-
rants are properly issued, the conduct of the executing officers 
must not exceed the bounds of reason . . . . Part of the 
boundary of reason is formed by the requirement that officers 
of the law must announce their presence, identity and purpose 
prior to their entrance upon private premises to execute a 
search warrant. 
51. See United States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251, 257 (6th Cir. 1981). 
52. 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
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that the fourth amendment prohibits an unannounced forcible 
entry by police officers.1I8 Justice Marshall in United States v. 
Sabbath,1I4 referred to the notice requirement as a "possible con-
stitutional rule relating to announcement and entry,"1I1I indicat-
ing that the constitutional basis for the rule is still in question. 
The few courts which have confronted the issue have all con-
curred with Blank, and with Justice Brennan's dissent in Ker, 
finding that notice before forced entry is an inherent require-
ment of the fourth amendment.1I6 
The courts which have held that notice is required under 
the fourth amendment additionally have found that notice is 
necessary under the federal statute when the area entered is a 
house.1I7 Alternatively, as in Francis v. United States,1I8 the court 
may find that although 18 U.S.C. § 3109 does not prevent of-
ficers from forcibly entering an area unannounced, the fourth 
amendment does prohibit the entry.1I9 In Francis, the Third Cir-
cuit found that a barbershop was not included within the mean-
ing of a "house" as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 3109, and was 
consequently not protected by the statute.60 The court alterna-
tively considered whether the fourth amendment prohibited the 
officer's unannounced intrusion into the barbershop. The court 
found that the fourth amendment did prohibit the intrusion and 
held the entry unlawfuJ.61 
53. Id. at 46-47. 
54. 391 U.S. 585 (1968). 
55. Id. at 591. 
56. See United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir. 1979); United States 
v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251, 258 (6th Cir. 1981); and United States v. Gable, 276 F. Supp. 
555, 557 (E.D.C. Pa. 1967). 
57. See United States v. Price, 441 F. Supp. 814 (D.C. Ark. 1977), where the court 
stated that "[iln applying that tradition vis-a-vis either the fourth amendment or § 3109, 
courts have consistently held that before. officers enter upon private premises to conduct 
a search pursuant to a warrant, they must make an announcement of their identity, au-
thority and purpose for seeking entry, .... " Id. at 817. 
58. 646 F.2d 251 (3rd Cir. 1981). 
59. Id. See also Wattenburg, where the court stated: "The protection afforded by 
the Fourth Amendment, insofar as houses are concerned, has never been restricted to the 
interior of the house, but has extended to open areas immediately adjacent thereto." 388 
F.2d at 857. 
60. 646 F.2d at 256. 
61. Id. at 257-58. See also United States v. Miguel, 340 F.2d 812 (2nd Cir. 1965) 
(holding that the fourth amendment does not protect an apartment dweller from official 
intrusion into a common lobby); United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976) 
(finding that an apartment dweller had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a common 
hallway and that the defendant's fourth amendment rights were thus violated by the 
37
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C. REASONING OF THE COURT 
In reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit in Moreno 
cited three interests protected by 18 U.S.C. § 3109.62 They found 
that it "provides protection from violence, assuring the safety 
and security of both the occupants and the entering officers;"63 
"protects 'the precious interest of privacy summed up in the an-
cient adage that a man's house is his castle' ";64 and finally that 
it "protects against the needless destruction of private prop-
erty."611 The court held that in accord with these interests, and 
contrary to the district court's finding, the defendant did in fact 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcove area, and 
that the alcove area was actually part of the defendant's apart-
ment.66 In support of this reasoning, the court noted the defen-
dant's complete control of the gate, his exclusive use of the al-
cove, that the alcove was formed by three walls. of the 
defendant's apartment, and that nonresidents could gain access 
into the alcove only after ringing a buzzer located near the 
gate.67 The court noted that these factors, similar to those con-
sidered by the court in Fluker,6s indicated a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.8s The court rejected the lower court's considera-
tion of the visual accessibility of the alcove as a pertinent factor 
stating that "[t]he statute expressly applies to windows, clearly 
indicating that an officer's ability to see into an area does not 
defeat the occupants' privacy and security interests in it."70 
Thus, relying on their decision in Fluker,71 the court con-
officers' unreasonable intrusion); Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1956) (ap-
plied the fourth amendment to a cave near a dwelling). 
62. 701 F.2d at 817. 
63. [d. citing United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1973) and 
United States v. Fluker, 453 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976). 
64. 701 F.2d at 817 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958». 
65. 701 F.2d at 817 (citing Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, and United States v. 
Crawford, 657 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1981». 
66. 701 F.2d at 817. 
67. [d. 
68. 543 F.2d 709. In Fluker, the court noted that there were only three apartments 
in the building entered by the officers, the outer door of the building was kept locked, 
only the three apartment residents had keys, and the defendant's apartment was within 
reach of the outer door. [d. at 716. 
69. 701 F.2d at 817. 
70. [d. 
71. 543 F.2d 709. 
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eluded that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the alcove, and also that the alcove was a part of the 
defendant's apartment. Since the alcove was considered part of 
the defendant's apartment, the court found that the officers 
should have complied with 18 U.S.C. § 3109 before entering 
through the gate.72 
D. ANALYSIS 
The court in Moreno mistakenly relied on Fluker73' in apply-
ing the reasonable expectation of privacy test to 18 U.S.C. § 
3109. In addition, factors cited by the court fail to establish that 
the alcove outside the defendant's apartment should be consid-
ered as part of the defendant's apartment. Finally, the court's 
improper extension of the statute appears to have been unneces-
sary in light of an analagous line of cases which have applied the 
fourth amendment to similar facts. 
The Moreno court, in determining that the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test was applicable under the statute, im-
properly relied upon the Fluker court's mistaken application of 
the test to the statute. The Ninth Circuit in Fluker determined 
that, according to its decision in Wattenburg v. United States,74 
the appropriate test in determining if an area was protected by 
18 U.S.C. § 3109 was whether the defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in that area.711 The court in Fluker how-
ever, failed to recognize that the decision in Wattenburg in-
volved an open area 20-35 feet from the defendant's home, and 
was based solely on the fourth amendment rights of the defen-
dant.78 Wattenburg did not involve the application of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3109. Similarly, the Fluker court mistakenly found that the 
72. 701 F.2d at 817. After finding that the statute did apply to the alcove area, the 
court considered the government's contention that the inevitable discovery doctrine was 
applicable and warranted admission of the evidence. [d. at 819. The court rejected this 
argument stating that the inevitable discovery doctrine "requires that the otherwise 
inadmissible evidence would have been discovered independently by legal means . . . . 
Because we do not view the second entry as independent of the unlawful entry, we do 
not apply the 'inevitable discovery' rule." [d. 
73. 543 F.2d 709. 
74. 388 F.2d 853. 
75. 543 F.2d at 716 (citing Wattenburg, 388 F.2d at 857). 
76. 388 F.2d at 858. 
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decision in Blank77 applied 18 U.S.C. § 3109 to an outer door of 
an apartment building.78 Although the defendant in Blank 
claimed both a statutory and a fourth amendment violation,79 
the court based the decision solely on the fourth amendment.8o 
The Fluker court was thus the first court to apply the reasona-
ble expectation of privacy test to 18 U.S.C. § 3109, and it ap-
pears to have done so under the mistaken impression that the 
courts in Blank and Wattenburg had done the same.8} Conse-
quently, by applying Fluker, the Moreno court has relied on a 
mistaken determination that the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test had been applied to 18 U.S.C. § 3109. 
It is well established that the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test is appropriate in determining whether an area is pro-
tected under the fourth amendment.82 It is not clear that the 
same test is appropriate in determining whether an area is pro-
tected under 18 U.S.C. § 3109. 
The court in Fluker determined that where a defendant had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in an area outside his apart-
ment, that area was covered by the statute.83 In relying on the 
reasonable expectation test in Fluker, the court in Moreno fails 
to recognize that although a person will typically maintain a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the area constituting his or her 
home, the same person may also have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in a variety of other areas such as a phone booth,8" a 
public restroom,811 or an automobile.8s Clearly these areas cannot 
be considered part of a home. 
The reasonable expectation of privacy test employed by the 
Ninth Circuit in Moreno is thus overly broad, and does not pro-
vide an exclusive factor indicating that an area should be consid-
77. 251 F. Supp. 166. 
78. 543 F.2d at 715. 
79. 251 F. Supp. at 168. 
80. Id. at 175. 
81. See United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, where the court notes the absence of 
any cases, with the exception of Blank, 251 F. Supp. 166, which expand the application 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 beyond the entrance of a home or dwelling. 543 F.2d at 715. 
82. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
83. 543 F.2d at 716. 
84. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
85. State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205 (1970). 
86. Coolidge v. New Hantpshire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971). 
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ered part of a home, or covered under the statute. 
The court in Fluker cited several factors which supported 
its finding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the common hallway.87 The court found that based on 
this reasonable expectation of privacy, the common hallway was 
protected under the statute.88 The court in Moreno took this 
reasoning one step further and found that the factors indicating 
the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the al-
cove also indicated that the alcove was actually part of the de-
fendant's apartment.89 Thus, the court found the alcove pro-
tected under the statute because it was considered part of the 
defendant's apartment.90 Though factors cited by the court indi-
cate the defendant may have had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the alcove area, there is no indication that the alcove 
was actually part of the defendant's apartment. 
Exclusive control and access to the area indicate that the 
defendant may have expected the alcove to remain free from un-
reasonable intrusion, but these factors do not change the physi-
cal structure of the apartment. The alcove outside the defen-
dant's apartment does not become a part of the defendant's 
apartment merely because it is in the defendant's exclusive con-
trol. Exclusive control is typically exercised by the possessor of 
real and personal property, however it cannot be assumed that 
property in one's exclusive control is automatically part of one's 
home. 
The court also found it significant that the alcove was 
formed of three outer walls of the defendant's apartment.91 The 
code specifically provides for protection of areas within the 
home, but makes no provision for protection of areas adjacent to 
the outer walls of a home.92 The alcove provided access to the 
solid front door, and the solid front door provided access to the 
defendant's apartment.93 The court cited no facts to indicate the 
87. See supra note 59. 
88. 543 F.2d at 716. 
89. 701 F.2d at 817. 
90.Id. 
91. Id. 
92. See supra note 2. 
93. 701 F.2d at 816. 
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defendant used the alcove for any purpose other than gaining 
access to his front door. Though the alcove, just as a sidewalk or 
driveway, may have been used to gain access to a dwelling, there 
is no indication that the alcove was actually a part of the apart-
ment and thus covered under the statute. 
Although the Supreme Court has not held that notice is re-
quired under the fourth amendment,9. lower court decisions 
dealing with the issue indicate a trend toward finding such a re-
quirement.9& According to these courts, the fourth amendment 
requires that officers give notice of their authority and purpose 
before entering an area in which a person maintains a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.96 These courts require notice regardless 
of whether the area entered by officers was found to be part of a 
house.97 Thus, under this view, an unannounced forcible entry 
into a home would be prohibited by both the fourth amendment 
and by 18 U.S.C. § 3109.98 However, an unannounced entry into 
an area adjacent to a house would be covered by the Fourth 
Amendment, but would not be covered by 18 U.S.C. § 3109.99 
The legislative intent and historical application of the statute 
indicate that the statute was intended to protect the home 
only.loo Consequently, the fourth amendment is the only appro-
priate protection to apply when confronted with an official 
unannounced entry into an area adjacent to a house. 
The Ninth Circuit in Wattenburg v. United States,lOl found 
that the fourth amendment protected an open area used to store 
wood, located approximately 20-35 feet from the defendant's 
home, from a warrantless intrusion. The Wattenburg court 
found that the appropriate test in determining if a search and 
seizure adjacent to a house was constitutionally forbidden was 
whether it constituted an intrusion upon what the resident 
sought to preserve as private. l02 In Blank,103 relied upon by the 
94. See supra p.6. 
95. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
96. [d. 
97. See supra note 59. 
98. See supra note 57. 
99. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussion of Francis). 
100. See supra notes 22 and 25. 
101. 388 F.2d at 853. 
102. [d. at 857. 
103. 251 F. Supp. 166. 
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Ninth Circuit in Fluker,104 the court stated that under the 
fourth amendment, officers were required to give notice of their 
authority and purpose before entering a common area shared by 
apartment residents. 1011 The court in Moreno found that the de-
fendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area, the 
area was adjacent to the defendant's apartment, and the area 
was entered by officials without announcement. Thus, as in 
Wattenburg and Blank, the fourth amendment would have suffi-
ciently protected the alcove from an unreasonable intrusion, and 
an extended application of the statute was unnecessary. 
It is unclear why the Ninth Circuit chose to apply the fed-
eral statue to the facts in Moreno rather than apply the fourth 
amendment as it did in Wattenburg. Given the current trend of 
applying the fourth amendment to facts similar to those in 
Moreno,106 it appears that the Ninth Circuit should have applied 
the fourth amendment, and thus avoided straining the federal 
statute. 
Thomas M. Hostetler* 
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW & 
PROCEDURE 
A. Grand Jury Witnesses' Right to Inspect Government 
Documents 
In In re McElhinney,! the Ninth Circuit held that a grand 
jury witness is entitled to conditional access to government doc-
uments for the purpose of challenging the legality of the govern-
ment's wiretapping of his telephone. 
The witness, Todd McElhinney, refused to testify before a 
104. 543 F.2d at 715. 
105. 251 F. Supp. 167. See supra note 40. 
106. See supra pp. 6-7. 
* Hastings College of the Law, Class of 1985. 
1. 698 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Goodwin, J., the other panel members were 
Skopil and Boochever, J.J.) (as revised Jan. 31, 1983). 
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Ninth Circuit in Fluker,104 the court stated that under the 
fourth amendment, officers were required to give notice of their 
authority and purpose before entering a common area shared by 
apartment residents. 1011 The court in Moreno found that the de-
fendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area, the 
area was adjacent to the defendant's apartment, and the area 
was entered by officials without announcement. Thus, as in 
Wattenburg and Blank, the fourth amendment would have suffi-
ciently protected the alcove from an unreasonable intrusion, and 
an extended application of the statute was unnecessary. 
It is unclear why the Ninth Circuit chose to apply the fed-
eral statue to the facts in Moreno rather than apply the fourth 
amendment as it did in Wattenburg. Given the current trend of 
applying the fourth amendment to facts similar to those in 
Moreno,106 it appears that the Ninth Circuit should have applied 
the fourth amendment, and thus avoided straining the federal 
statute. 
Thomas M. Hostetler* 
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW & 
PROCEDURE 
A. Grand Jury Witnesses' Right to Inspect Government 
Documents 
In In re McElhinney,! the Ninth Circuit held that a grand 
jury witness is entitled to conditional access to government doc-
uments for the purpose of challenging the legality of the govern-
ment's wiretapping of his telephone. 
The witness, Todd McElhinney, refused to testify before a 
104. 543 F.2d at 715. 
105. 251 F. Supp. 167. See supra note 40. 
106. See supra pp. 6-7. 
* Hastings College of the Law, Class of 1985. 
1. 698 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Goodwin, J., the other panel members were 
Skopil and Boochever, J.J.) (as revised Jan. 31, 1983). 
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federal grand jury, claiming that the questions asked were based 
on information obtained from the government's illegal monitor-
ing of his telephone conversations.2 After the government admit-
ted using a court-ordered wiretap, McElhinney requested dis-
closure of government documents for a limited hearing on the 
legality of the wiretap.3 The trial court denied McElhinney's re-
quest concluding that an in camera inspection of the documents 
was sufficient to determine the legality of the wiretap.· When 
McElhinney persisted in his refusal to testify, the court held 
him in contempt and ordered him confined. Ii McElhinney ap-
pealed the confinement order.8 
In several previous cases, the Ninth Circuit rejected a ple'-
nary suppression hearing on the wiretap issue because such a 
hearing would disrupt and delay the grand jury investigation.7 
In these rulings, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit's 
holding in In re Persico.s The Persico court held a witness is not 
entitled to a plenary suppression hearing on the issue of whether 
the questions posed are the product of unlawful electronic 
surveillance.9 
In McElhinney, the Ninth Circuit distinguished earlier 
cases which denied hearings, noting that McElhinney requested 
a limited, not a plenary, hearing. lo The Ninth Circuit found in 
the Persico reasoning a balance between the competing policies 
2. Id. at 384. McElhinney had been granted immunity before being ordered to tes-
~U . 
3. Id. McElhinney requested the application of the Attorney General for authoriza-
tion to conduct the wiretap, the affidavit in support of the application, the court order 
authorizing the wiretap, and the affidavit describing the duration of the wiretap. Id. 
4. Id. at 385. The trial court concluded that further review of the matter would 
unduly delay the grand jury proceedings. Id. 
5. Id. at 384. 
6.Id. 
7. Droback v. United States, 509 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 
(1975) (no plenary challenge was permitted), In re Gordon, 534 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(the court allowed no plenary hearing on the issue of availability of alternative investiga-
tive techniques at the time the court-ordered electronic surveillance), United States v. 
Canon, 534 F.2d 139 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 991 (1976) (a witness was not 
allowed to delay a grand jury hearing by litigating the validity of the surveillance). 
8. 491 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 924 (1974). 
9. Id. at 1162. But ct. In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1974), in which the 
First Circuit allowed access to government documents for a limited hearing absent a 
government need for secrecy. 497 F.2d at 807. 
10. 698 F.2d at 385. 
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of exclusion of illegally obtained evidence and the demand for 
unimpeded grand jury proceedings, with the balance weighing in 
favor of unimpeded grand jury proceedings.ll The court noted 
that granting McElhinney a limited hearing would not upset this 
balance, as the short time spent on a limited hearing promotes 
the policy of excluding illegally obtained evidence.12 The Ninth 
Circuit held that McElhinney had the right to examine the re-
quested documents,18 but he could not use any additional evi-
dence to support his challenge of the wiretap. 14 
The court ruled that if the government objects to disclosure 
on security grounds,1& the district court must determine in cam-
era the sensitivity of the documents. IS The witness is then al-
lowed to inspect relevant documents judged not sensitive. I '1 
Accordingly, McElhinney establishes that a witness in the 
Ninth Circuit may inspect government documents when chal-
lenging a court-orderedI8 wiretap he or she contends is illegal. 
B. The Pretextual Use of a Warrant to Justify a Custodial 
Detention Violates the Fourth Amendment 
In United States v. Prim,1 the Ninth Circuit held that fed-
eral agents could not rely on an outstanding nonsupport warrant 
to justify a custodial detention where the agents stated that 
their actual purpose for the detention was to interrogate and 
search a suspected narcotics trafficker. The court stated that 
such a pretextual justification for an arrest or search violates the 
fourth amendment. 
11. [d. 
12. [d. 
13. See supra note 3. 
14. 698 F.2d at 385-86. 
15. [d. at 385. 
16. [d. 
17. [d. 
18. The Supreme Court has ruled that a grand jury witness may use an unautho-
rized wiretap as a defense to a contempt charge for refusal to testify. Gelbard v. United 
States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). The Court specifically left to trial courts the decision to allow 
testimony based on court-ordered wiretaps. 408 U.S. at 61, n.22. 
1. 698 F.2d 972 (9th ('ir. 1983) (per Takasugi, D.J., sitting by designation; the other 
panel members were Hug, J., concurring, and Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
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While the defendant waited at the Portland airport for a 
plane to Honolulu, his nervous behavior aroused the suspicion of 
police who subsequently placed him under surveillance. After 
departing on his flight, the police relayed information that the 
defendant had been involved in a 1979 narcotics investigation to 
DEA agents in Honolulu.2 Portland police then discovered an 
outstanding Oregon nonsupport warrant for the defendant.Po-
lice also relayed information to the Hawaiian agents about the 
warrant. 3 
Upon arrival at the Honolulu airport, DEA agents stopped 
the defendant and checked his identification. After informing 
him of their suspicion that he was trafficking in narcotics, they 
escorted him to an "office.'" The warrant for nonsupport was 
not mentioned. In the interrogation room, agents asked the de-
fendant twice to consent to a search of his person and effects, 
but both times he refused. The agents had the defendant empty 
his pockets. In doing so, he neglected to remove an envelope 
which caused a bulge in a front pocket.1I After conducting a pat-
down search and removing the envelope which later turned out 
to be cocaine, the agents arrested the defendant. The District 
Court found that the detention and search did not violate the 
defendant's fourth amendment rights because of the Oregon ar-
rest warrant.8 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, defendant con-
tended that the detention constituted an arrest without proba-
ble cause since the agents detained him for no other reason than 
to conduct a custodial interrogation and to obtain consent to 
search his person and property.7 
According to the Ninth Circuit, the record established that 
the agents' actions were motivated only by their suspicion that 
the defendant was a drug trafficker. Judge Takasugi, writing for 
the Court, rejected the government's contention that the war-
rant provided probable cause for the agents' actions.8 He stated 
that although probable cause is judicially viewed under an objec-
2. Id. at 973-74. 
3. Id. at 974. 
4. Id. 
S.Id. 
6. Id. at 975. 
7. Id. 
8.Id. 
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tive standard "the nonsupport warrant was not the cause of the 
officers' action and thus not the cause to which the objective 
standard should be applied."e Judge Takasugi reasoned that, if 
anything, the warrant provided a pretext after the fact to justify 
the agents' actions, and such pretextual use violates the fourth 
amendment.1o 
Finding no probable cause, Judge Takasugi next focused on 
the defendant's detention in the interrogation room. In light of 
the Supreme Court's decision in Dunaway v. New York,ll Judge 
Takasugi determined that the detention constituted custodial 
interrogation, which like an arrest required justification with 
probable cause.12 He distinguished the Supreme Court's decision 
in United States v. Mendenhall/3 which upheld a consensual 
relocation to an airport interrogation room, by noting that here 
there was no evidence that the defendant consented to the relo-
cation and detention for interrogation. I. Judge Takasugi pointed 
out that even if the relocation were constitutional, the continued 
detention after the defendant's refusal to consent to a search 
constituted custodial interrogation without probable cause under 
the reasoning of Dunaway and Chamberlin. 1I1 He reasoned that 
9. [d. Judge Takasugi emphasized that he did not mean to base probable cause on 
the subjective state of mind of the officers. [d. 
10. [d. (emphasis added). See, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); South 
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976). 
11. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). In Dunaway, the Court held that the relocation of a suspect 
to police headquarters for custodial interrogation requires probable cause. The Court 
reasoned that a detention for custodial interrogation intrudes so severely on interests 
protected by the fourth amendment that it necessarily"triggers the traditional safeguards 
against illegal arrest. [d. 
12. 698 F.2d at 976-77. 
13. 446 U.S. 544. In Mendenhall, the defendant was stopped in the airport as she 
got off a plane and subsequently relocated to the DEA office for questioning. After find-
ing the initial stop valid the Court validated the relocation stating that the evidence was 
sufficient to support a finding that the defendant voluntarily consented to the relocation. 
[d. 
14, 698 F.2d at 976-77. Judge Takasugi made it clear that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
which allows a "stop" based on articulable suspicion, did not apply to the relocation 
since it involved a greater intrusion than a brief investigatory stop. 698 F.2d at 977. 
Judge Takasugi followed United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(twenty-minute detention of suspect in back of police car while officer searched for sus-
pect's companion was detention for custodial detention) and distinguished United States 
v. Post, 607 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1979) (relocation of a suspect to an airport interview room 
based upon articulable suspicion valid where there was no explicit finding of 
involuntariness). 
15. 698 F.2d at 977. 
48
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss1/7
134 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:131 
the subsequent pat-down search was unjustified, and the cocaine 
taken from the defendant was thereby tainted by the illegal de-
tention. ls Further, Judge Takasugi stated that the pat-down 
search could not be justified because the agents actually ex-
pected to find narcotics in the bulge of the defendant's pocket. A 
pat-down, he stated, is properly limited only to a search for 
weapons. 17 
Judge Hug concurred with the majority opinion that even if 
the relocation was constitutional, the continued detention con-
stituted custodial interrogation without probable cause. IS He 
also agreed that the government's reliance on the warrant to 
provide probable cause for the detention represented ~n after 
the fact justification for an unlawful search. He stated that an 
arrest cannot be used as a pretext to search for evidence of an 
unrelated crime. IS 
Judge Alarcon, dissenting, maintained that the majority im-
properly based probable cause for arrest upon the agent's sub-
jective state of mind.20 He stated that the probable cause deter-
mination must be based on objective facts that could justify the 
issuance of a warrant, not on the agent's subjective state of 
mind.21 Applying this standard, he· reasoned that the objective 
facts known to the agents prior to the detention and search, in-
cluding the outstanding warrant, established probable cause to 
arrest.22 Since by his analysis the arrest was lawful, Judge Alar-
con found the subsequent search of the defendant justified as a 
search incident to arrest.23 
Judge Alarcon disagreed with the majority's conclusion that 
16. Id. at 977. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
17. 698 F.2d at 977. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). 
18. 698 F.2d at 978. 
19. Id. at 978. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932); Williams v. 
United States, 418 F.2d 159, 161 (9th Cir. 1969) aff'd 401 U.S. 646 (1971). 
Judge Hug, in his concurrence, also asserted that the DEA agents were without 
power to arrest the defendant on state charges. See 21 U.S.C. § 878 which limits the 
authority of federal law enforcement officers. See also, United States v. Diamond, 471 
F.2d 771, 773 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973). 
20. 698 F.2d at 980 (emphasis in original). 
21. Id. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808 (1982). 
22. 698 F.2d at 980. 
23. Id. at 979. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
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the agents used the nonsupport warrant as a pretext for the 
search.24 He believed that the record demonstrated that the 
agents had acted in complete good faith and exhibited great sen-
sitivity in choosing the least intrusive means of interfering with 
the rights of an individual under suspicion. He stated that the 
agents could have made an immediate and embarrassing arrest 
in the middle of the airport, but instead chose to make a quiet 
and discreet request of the defendant in the hope that he would 
consent to a search. Judge Alarcon reasoned that this conduct 
did not violate the fourth amendment, which prohibits only un-
reasonable law enforcement conduct.2& 
C. Waiver of Counsel 
In Evans v. Raines,l the Ninth Circuit held that a limited 
retrospective state court hearing is sufficient to determine 
whether the defendant is competent to waive counsel and 
whether a waiver was intelligently made. 
The defendant was charged with rape and kidnaping for 
rape. Based on psychiatric evaluations, the state court found the 
defendant competent to stand trial. When the defendant asked 
to represent himself, the court admonished him of the risks and 
responsibilities of self representation.2 However, the court 
neither informed the defendant of the maximum punishment for 
the offenses charged, nor held a hearing to determine defen-
d~nt's competency to represent himself. The defendant was con-
victed on both counts.3 
The conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona.4 The defendant filed a habeus corpus petition in the dis-
trict court, contending that the trial record did not disclose 
24. 698 F.2d at 980. 
25. [d. In response to Judge Hug's assertion that the federal agents lacked authority 
to arrest pursuant to the Oregon arrest warrant, Judge Alarcon maintained that the 
agents were authorized to make arrests under a Hawaiian statute. In addition, he noted 
that a Hawaiian police officer who had authority to arrest pursuant to the Oregon war· 
rant was present at the defendant's detention and search. [d. at 979. 
1. 705 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Smith, J., sitting by designation; the other 
panel members were Merri!, J. and Boochever, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
2. [d. at 1482. 
3. [d. at 1480. 
4. State v. Evans, 125 Ariz. 401, 610 P.2d 35 (1980). 
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whether defendant was competent to waive counselor whether 
the waiver was intelligently made. Ii The district court ordered 
defendant's'release unless proceedings for a new trial were com-
menced, and the state appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
In reviewing the district court's order, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that a defendant cannot intelligently waive counsel unless 
he is apprised of the penalties which may be imposed for the 
crimes which he is charged. Because the state court provided no 
such information, the court noted that the defendant could not 
have intelligently waived counsel.s 
On the issue of competency to waive counsel, the court, cit-
ing Westbrook v. Arizona,7 noted that a higher level of compe-
tency is required to waive counsel than is necessary to stand 
trial. In absence of findings or a hearing on defendant's compe-
tency to waive counsel, it was necessary to remand to state court 
so this determination could be made.8 
In deciding whether a new trial was necessary, or whether a 
limited remand would suffice, the court cited United States v. 
Kimmel. 9 In Kimmel, the court held that a limited remand is 
proper to supplement a record that does not show a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of counsel. 10 
The court further stated that a retrospective competency 
hearing is sufficient to determine if a defendant is competent to 
waive counsel. The court, relying upon two decisions involving 
guilty pleas,11 found no reason for applying a different rule 
where competency to waive counsel is at issue.12 Accordingly, the 
case was remanded to district court with directions to send the 
case to state court for a further hearing to hold a competency 
hearing. 
5. Evans v. Raines, 534 F.Supp. 791 (D. Ariz. 1982). 
6. 705 F.2d at 1480. 
7. 384 U.S. 150 (1966). 
8. 705 F.2d at 1480. 
9. 672 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1982). 
10. Id. at 722-23. 
11. Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1981) and Sieling v. Eymin, 478 
F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1973). 
12. 705 F.2d at 1481. 
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Judge Merrill, concurring, suggested that when counsel is 
waived that the colloquy between court and defendant be placed 
on the record. 13 He noted that this would eliminate the need for 
further litigation in such cases to determine if the waiver was 
made intelligently.14 However, he would not require that such a 
record be made as a matter of constitutional right. 111 
Judge Boochever, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
questioned the propriety of holding a competency hearing at this 
point in the litigation. IS He stated that if this were a federal case 
he would simply affirm the district court's order. He noted, how-
ever, that since this was a state case, the decision on the feasibil-
ity of holding such a hearing should be left to the state court.17 
13.Id. 
14.Id. 
15.Id. 
16. Id. at 1482. 
17. Id. 
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